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ABSTRACT 
This study is addressed into five chapters. It cuts across the central question aimed at 
looking the convergence of peace and justice in restoring a peaceful situation in 
Burundi transitional justice from the past atrocities. The study traces the background 
of the problem since when the country attained her independence. It shows the 
groups that were in disputes and the initiatives taken under regional and international 
level. The study is on the theoretical and legal framework of Peace and Justice. This 
paves a way for the discussion on the concept of transitional justice and its elements: 
prosecution, truth telling or truth commission, traditional justice methods, reparation 
and institution. This work also covers the concept of justice and peace. It discusses 
how the concept of justice and peace have been undertaken together towards 
resolving conflict by taking experience from other countries like Argentina and 
Yugoslavia. Then, it shows how the two concepts complement each other. The study 
further provides a thorough overview of transitional justice in Burundi and the steps 
taken by the East African Community and International instrument to deal with the 
conflict. The EAC appointed leader like President Yoweri Museveni and former 
president of United Republic of Tanzania, Benjamin William Mkapa to try to 
mediate the conflicting parties. The same was done by the UN through the Kalomoh 
report which came with recommendations on how to resolve the conflict as well as 
currently the initiatives taken by the UN Commission on Human Rights through the 
UNIIB with purpose of finding a way to peaceful society by investigating the matter. 
Finally, the study provides for research findings and discussion, and whereas the last 
part deals with conclusion and recommendation following the discussion undertaken 
in this study basing on the raised issues.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Research 
The post conflict Burundi has experienced several cycles of violence since the 
country’s independence in 1962. In 1965 an unsuccessful coup d’état by a group of 
Hutu gendarmes triggered retribution by the Tutsi dominated national army. This 
pattern repeated itself several times in the following decades. In 1972 a Hutu led 
insurrection, caused by the more or less systematic exclusion of Hutu from 
government institutions, triggered a violent response by the national army and led to 
the killing and disappearances of many Hutu intellectuals.1 In 1988, there was an 
outburst of violence and around 20,000 Hutu were killed by the national army. After 
democratization efforts at the beginning of the 1990s, a civil war broke out in 1993 
with the assassination of the first democratically elected president, Melchior 
Ndadaye.2 
 
In August 2000, political parties in Burundi signed the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement3, but it did not end the violence, as the Hutu dominated 
rebel movements at the time, the Defense of Democracy Forces for the Defense of 
Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL 
Palipehutu), were not included in the peace negotiations.4 The agreement included 
                                                            
1 Uvin P, Life after Violence: A People’s Story of Burundi, Zed Books, London and New York, 2009. 
2Daley P, The Burundi Peace Negotiations: An African Experience of Peace-making, in: Review of African  
  Political Economy, 2007, Pg. 34, 112, 333-352. 
3 Arusha Agreement, Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000. Available at:  
  https://www.issafrica.org/cdburundipeaceagreements/No%201%20arusha.pdf. (Accessed on May 01, 2016)  
4 Sculier  C, Négociations de paix au Burundi: Une justice encombrante mais incontournable, HD Report,  
  Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2008. 
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provisions on transitional justice namely, a Truth Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 
which would shed light on the truth about grave violence, promote reconciliation and 
forgiveness, and clarify the entire history of Burundi.  
 
The International Judicial Commission of Inquiry (IJCI) was aimed to be set up to 
investigate and establish the facts relating to genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Based on its findings regarding the occurrence of such acts, an 
international criminal tribunal was also on the way to be set up to implement trial 
processes and punitive measures for those held responsible Arusha.5 While the TRC 
and IJCI were meant to be set up during the transitional period between the year of 
2001 and 2005, neither of them has been established so far. The transitional 
government did not consider transitional justice a priority; instead, its preoccupation 
was with ending the violent hostilities, integrating the rebels into the state structures 
and preparing the elections and the new constitution. This also holds true for the 
armed groups like the CNDD-FDD and FNL, as they did not focus on talking about 
truth, but rather on obtaining a position of strength through their integration into the 
government and state structures. 
 
In 2004 the Parliament of Burundi passed a law on the establishment of the TRC, but 
it was never implemented.6 In the same year, the United Nations (UN) sent an 
international assessment mission to evaluate the advisability and feasibility of the 
IJCI.7 The resulting Kalomoh Report of 2005 called for a reconsideration of the 
                                                            
5  Supra note 3  
6 Vandeginste  S,  La Commission Vérité et Réconciliation et la qualification des faits: une question à première 
vue purement technique, 2011,  Available at  
www.arib.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3772 ( accessed on  July 19, 2016). 
7 Vandeginste  S,  Le processus de justice transitionnelle au Burundi a l’epreuve de son contexte politique, in: 73 
Droit et Société 3, 2009, Pg. 591-611. 
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Arusha formula that is the TRC, IJCI and the international criminal tribunal and 
proposed a twin mechanism, consisting of a TRC and a judicial process. Following 
the endorsement of the Kalomoh Report, the UN and the new CNDD-FDD 
dominated government negotiated the implementation of the report’s 
recommendations in 2006 and 2007. The main issues of disagreement were the 
question of amnesty for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; the 
independence of the special tribunal’s prosecutor; and the interrelationship between 
the TRC and the tribunal.8 In 2007, the negotiating parties eventually agreed to hold 
popular consultations on transitional justice. These consultations on the modalities 
and composition of the TRC and the tribunal were finally conducted in 2009.9 
 
In June 2011 the Burundian president nominated a Technical Committee, whose 
responsibility it was to draft the law that would establish the TRC and its functions. 
As of November 2012, the draft law was expected to be studied soon by the Council 
of Ministers and the National Assembly.10 However, the judicial mechanism, the 
special criminal tribunal, has as of today not yet been conceptualized, and when and 
whether this mechanism will be established remains unknown. Thus, twelve years 
after the signing of the Arusha agreement, none of the transitional justice provisions 
have been implemented. This has led practitioners and advocates of a global 
transitional justice policy11 to argue that there is no political will by Burundian 
                                                            
8Ndikumasabo  M, and Vandeginste  S, Mecanismes de justice et de reconciliation en perspective au Burundi, 
2007, in: Stefaan Marysse, Filip Reyntjens, and Stef  Vandeginste (eds.), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs:Annuaire, 
Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006-2007, Pg. 109-133.  
9 Comité de Pilotage Tripartite (CPT), Les consultations nationales sur la mise en place des mécanismes de 
justice de transition au Burundi, Bujumbura, 2010. 
10 IWACU, L’avant-projet de loi régissant la CVR bientôt en conseil des ministres, Bujumbura, November11,  
2012. 
11 Nagy R, Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections, in: 29Third World Quarterly2, 2008, Pg.  
275-289.  
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leaders to establish the TRC and the special criminal tribunal.12 Therefore, 
underlying from this claims, they provide for an assumption that, political actors are 
likely to contest the principles of transitional justice due to the fear that they could be 
held responsible for past crimes. A transitional justice process, particularly criminal 
prosecution, is seen by many political actors as a direct threat. If they would be 
investigated and or put on trial, political actors’ reputations would be at risk. 
 
They might also experience a loss of their power or political position if they are 
found responsible for human rights violations, not to mention long prison sentences 
if a special tribunal finds them guilty of having committed certain crimes. Such 
arguments of a lack of political will to deal with the past according to international 
transitional justice norms all stem from logic of rational choice. Consequently, 
advocates of a global transitional justice policy argue that actors who do not benefit 
from transitional justice or who may face consequences because of it are likely to act 
as spoilers, who will try to circumvent or manipulate it to meet their needs.13 The 
intuitive assumption is that the more power actors hold, the more capable they are of 
shaping transitional justice mechanisms in a way that serves their interests. The 
power relations influence any transitional justice process and that the resulting 
institutional design is an outcome of prevailing power constellations.14 Since the 
Arusha peace talks took place, power constellations have undergone considerable 
                                                            
12 Human Rights Watch, Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace, New York: Human Rights 
Watch, 2009. 
13Vandeginste  S, Stones Left Unturned: Law and Transitional Justice in Burundi, Antwerp, Oxford, Portland: 
Intersentia, 2010, As quoted from Subotić  J,  Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans, Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2009. 
14Rubli  S,  Power and Words: Power Constellations and Discourses in Transitional Justice Processes, 
Presentation at Transitional Justice Local Conflicts, Global Norms Conference, Marburg: Philips University, 
2010 As quoted from Sieff, Michelle, and Leslie Vinjamuri Wright, Reconciling Order and Justice? New 
Institutional Solutions in Post−Conflict States, in: 52Journal of International Affairs2, 1999, Pg. 757-779. 
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changes in Burundi. The former rebel groups CNDD-FDD and FNL, which were not 
included in the negotiations in Arusha, transformed themselves into political parties 
in 2005 and 2009, respectively. The power balance between different political parties 
may be largely determined by their representation in the government and the 
parliament. The first post-transition elections in 2005 were won by the CNDD-FDD; 
however, the UPRONA and the FRODEBU held a combined thirty per cent of the 
seats in the National Assembly.15 
 
In 2010 the CNDD-FDD won the elections with a majority, and UPRONA was 
represented by only seventeen seats in the National Assembly. Other political parties, 
among them the FRODEBU and the FNL, boycotted the presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Forming a coalition, they claimed that the communal 
elections were rigged.16 They are no longer represented in the government and 
parliament.17 Due to its electoral victory, the CNDD-FDD currently holds a powerful 
position and could in principle impose its stance on transitional justice to the 
detriment of other political parties. Nevertheless, the approach to transitional justice 
taken by the CNDD-FDD dominated government appears to be in line with the 
global transitional justice paradigm. Certainly factors of path dependency of the 
transitional justice policy as it was enshrined in the Arusha agreement strongly 
influenced by the FRODEBU and the UPRONA, the two strongest parties during the 
peace talks and pressure from international donors may play a role in shaping 
                                                            
15African Elections Database, Elections in Burundi, 2011. Available at http://african elections.tripod.com/bi.html 
(Accessed on July 18, 2016). 
16 ADC-Ikibiri .(2010).Mot liminaire de la conférence de presse tenu par la coalition ADC-Ikibiri, 10 août 2010, 
Press Conference, Bujumbura, 2010. 
17 Supra  note 15 
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Burundi’s official policy.18 It is difficult to judge the extent to which the CNDD-
FDD’s position influenced and is reflected in the government’s policy on transitional 
justice. However, such an analysis would go beyond the scope of this article, which 
primarily focuses on political parties. 
 
The Politics of Transitional Justice in Burundi has shown for the case of the former 
Yugoslavia, the alleged adherence to the global transitional justice model might be 
guided by ulterior political motives, including obtaining financial aid or international 
legitimacy. Although claims of attempts to manipulate and framing are widespread, 
relying on such an analysis is short-sighted.19 The social actors not only are driven by 
interests including securing advantages for specific individuals including themselves 
and groups, but in addition, their actions might be motivated by reason, passion 
and/or emotions which is highly subjective and it should be kept in mind that is the 
impartial consideration of the common good or of universal rights.20 Hence, it would 
be wrong to assume that political parties simply manipulate transitional justice 
institutions to suit the party members’ interests; instead it is likely that they are 
motivated by normative considerations as well. 
 
1.2 Statement of Research Problem 
The post conflict societies prefer peaceful negotiations as the first mechanism to end 
violence. The completions of peaceful negotiations give a room for justice to be 
undertaken. Though, the advancement in the international legal obligations and the 
                                                            
18 Subotić J, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, 
2009. 
19Elster  J, Coming to Terms with the Past: A Framework for the Study of Justice in the Transition to   
   Democracy, in: European Journal of Sociology, 1998, Pg. 39, 7−48.  
20 Ibid. 
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sophistication of the international justice building do consider the question of peace 
and justice as complementing each other in the process of resolving conflicts. This 
was stated by the UN General Secretary who emphasized on the importance of 
integrating justice into the process peace seeking.21 Therefore, both peace and justice 
are fundamental steps to end violence and preventing its recurrence.22 If peace would 
be dissociated from justice, would not address the fundamental structural causes of 
conflict.23However, in the case of Burundi both peace and justice have been 
dissociated from each other, and at the same time and still there is no consensus 
between the conflicting groups to deal with past atrocities. Hence, this study aimed at 
looking in depth the convergence of peace and justice towards ending past atrocities 
and ensuring harmonic situation in Burundi. 
 
1.3   Objective of the Study 
1.3.1   General Objective 
The core goal of the study is to examine the convergence of peace and justice 
towards rebuilding a peaceful society from past atrocities. 
 
1.3.2   Specific Objectives 
i. To examine how the convergence between peace and justice in restoring 
the past atrocities would lead into restoration of a peaceful society.  
ii. To examine how mechanisms to be employed in the process of resolving 
the past atrocities would succeed. 
                                                            
21Draft report Wilton Park Conference, “Transitional Justice and Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies: The 
Role  
    of International Actors”,  2005, Pg. 24-26 . 
22African Union Panel of the Wise, “Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges in 
the Fight against Impunity” The African Union Series. IPI: New York, 2013, Pg. 9. 
23 Jeong H, Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction, Ashgate: Aldershot, 2000. 
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1.4   Research Questions 
i. Whether the convergence between peace and justice in resolving the past 
atrocities would lead into restoration of a peaceful society? 
ii. Whether mechanisms to be employed in the process of resolving the past 
atrocities would succeed?  
  1.5   Significance of the Study 
a. The study will be of a great improvement to the national, regional and 
international facilitators to a dispute as it will equip them with better way to 
resolve the conflict. 
b. The study will help the government in ensuring the proper way to resolve 
conflicts by recognising the role of traditional methods. 
c. The study will be useful in creating policies and strategies to deal with past 
atrocities in Burundi move beyond the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) and an Special Tribunal (ST) as well as comprehensive 
reparations programs that fully integrate gender concerns which would be 
established, either independently or linked to the TRC and the ST, to address 
the rights of the victims and alleviate their continued suffering and 
destitution. 
 
1.6   Literature Review 
Matsuo, M24 the author in this paper attempts to trace the development of the concept 
of peace in peace studies, by an examination of studies on the peace concept and 
                                                            
24 Matsuo M, Concept of Peace Studies: A short Historical Sketch, Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima 
University, 2005,  Pg. 1- 26. Available at home.hiroshima_u.ac.jp/heiwa/Pub/E20/conceptopeace.pdf (Accessed 
on October 23, 2015) 
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definitions of peace by peace researchers, from two perspectives of peace value and 
peace sphere. It shows that the concept of peace employed in peace studies has been 
expanded both in peace value and peace sphere to include more than one peace value 
and peace sphere.25 This paper is utmost important as it helped to understand the 
concept of peace in wider situation though this study base on the convergence of 
peace and justice in contemporary transitional justice. 
  
Rubli, S26 the author highlights divergent conceptualizations of key elements of 
transitional justice that are part of the current contestation of the dealing-with-the-
past process in Burundi. Speaking to the emerging critical literature on transitional 
justice, this article attempts to look beyond claims that there is a lack of political will 
to comply with a certain global transitional justice paradigm.27 In this article, 
transitional justice is conceived of as a political process of negotiated values and 
power relations that attempts to constitute the future based on lessons from the past. 
The author in this article argues that political parties in Burundi use transitional 
justice not only as a strategy to protect partisan interests or target political opponents, 
but also as an instrument to promote their political struggles in the course of 
moulding a new, post-conflict society and state. The article has given the clear 
picture of the conflict in Burundi and the initiatives that have been undertaken to 
avoid the recurrence of the future conflict though that was not  adhered as in 2015 
when the country experience the political conflicts between different groups. 
                                                            
25 Ibid 
26 Rubli  S, National Consultations on Transitional Justice: The Inclusion of Civil Society in Transitional Justice 
in Burundi a paper presented at the 6th ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik: Iceland, 2011, Pg. 25- 27. 
Available at https:ecpr.eu/file store/paper proposal/5af408c−5c3a−41cd−ac27−e1cddc668142.pdf .( Accessed on 
August 11, 2016) 
27 Ibid 
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Therefore this study aimed at using peace and justice models to bring harmony in the 
country. The Commissioner for Human Rights,28 through this paper it deals with the 
process of post-war justice and the efforts aiming to establish durable peace in the 
region of the former Yugoslavia, following the armed conflicts in the 1990s 
characterised by ethnic cleansing and atrocities unseen in Europe since the Second 
World War. The paper focused on four major components of post-war justice: the 
necessary measures for the elimination of impunity; provision of adequate and 
effective reparation to war victims; the need to establish and recognise the truth 
concerning the gross human rights violations and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law that occurred in the region; and the guarantees of non-repetition 
through necessary institutional reforms.29 The paper is of significance to this study 
by helping to understand how other post conflict societies dealt with the past 
atrocities. 
 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,30 this research study  
produced by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), which is the main UN entity working on issues of human rights and 
transitional justice, is designed to contribute to discussions on these themes in Juba, 
in Ugandan society and internationally. These narratives are intended to inform 
wider public consultations on how best to redress past abuses, violations and deep-
seated social and economic inequalities by engaging formal and informal processes 
                                                            
28 Commissioner for Human Rights, Positions on Post−war justice and durable peace in the former Yugoslavia, 
Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2012, Pg. 1− 8. Available at https://wcd.coe.int/viewDoc.jsp?id=1904893 ( 
Accessed on May 16, 2015) 
29 Ibid 
30 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Making Peace Our own: Victims’ 
Perceptions of Accountability, Reconciliation and  Transitional Justice in Northern Uganda, United Nations, 
2007,  Pg.1, Available at www. Uganda. Ohchr.org/content/ Publications/making%20Peace% 20Our%20 
Own.pdf (Accessed on April 8, 2016) 
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of justice and reconciliation.31 The research study provide that  consultations will 
advance victims’ perspectives together with the views of other relevant stakeholders 
to ensure that affected individuals and communities can come to term with the past 
and build a just society. The study highlights the message of taking one’s own place 
in the process of establishing peace in northern Uganda.32 In which the prevailing 
message was greatly expressed by many of the respondents positively. The notion of 
peace, for the people who have been most adversely affected by the conflict, carried 
a strong sense of setting things right; encompassing the crucial yearning to end 
violence; a desire to return to their lands and to become self-sustainable; and a 
profound need for an accounting and redress of the misdeeds committed during the 
protracted cycle of violence.  As they repeatedly voiced, these elements will go a 
long way toward restoring their human dignity.33  
 
Therefore, the research study undertaken in Uganda is helpful in the study at hand as 
would be of assistance in the process of finding a way to a just society in Burundi by 
taking examples of how they succeeded to restore the peaceful situation in that area. 
The United Nations,34 the UN is aimed at assisting societies devastated by conflict or 
emerging from repressive rule to re-establish the rule of law and come to terms with 
large-scale human rights violations, especially within a context marked by broken 
institutions, exhausted resources, diminished security, and a distressed and divided 
population, presents a daunting challenge. The UN has acquired significant 
experience in developing the rule of law and pursuing transitional justice in States 
                                                            
31 Ibid 
32 Ibid, at Pg. 3 
33 Ibid, at Pg 4 -68 
34 United Nations, Guidance Note of the Secretary− General: UN Approach to Transitional Justice, March 2010, 
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emerging from conflict or repressive rule.35 The experience has demonstrated that 
promoting reconciliation and consolidating peace in the long-term necessitates the 
establishment or re- establishment of an effective governing administrative and 
justice system founded on respect for the rule of law and the protection of human 
rights.36 It should be noted that the transitional justice processes and mechanisms are 
a critical component of the UN framework for strengthening the rule of law.37 And it 
consists of both judicial and non-judicial processes and mechanisms, including 
prosecution initiatives, truth-seeking, reparations programmes, institutional reform or 
an appropriate combination thereof. Hence, whatever combination is chosen must be 
in conformity with international legal standards and obligations. Transitional justice 
should further seek to take account of the root causes of conflicts and the related 
violations of all rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights.38   
 
Therefore, by striving to address the spectrum of violations in an integrated and 
interdependent manner, transitional justice can contribute to achieving the broader 
objectives of prevention of further conflict, peace building and reconciliation.39 Thus, 
despite the clear challenge of addressing complex issues such as land inequality, the 
link between transitional justice and development could potentially ensure a more 
complete and effective approach for political and economic reforms that advance the 
case of redistributive justice and the pursuit of equality  within post-conflict 
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37 Ibid, at Pg. 2  
38 Ibid, at Pg. 3 
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society.40 The UN rule of law and transitional justice activities include developing 
standards and best practices, assisting in the design and implementation of 
transitional justice mechanisms, providing technical, material and financial support, 
and promoting the inclusion of human rights and transitional justice considerations in 
peace agreements.41 This was found helpful as the foundation of how the conflict in 
Burundi can be resolved by taking consideration of what has been given by the UN.42 
Though the matter at hand rely on the convergence of peace and justice but finding a 
way out from a root cause would be of significance towards the complimenting peace 
and justice to resolve conflicts. 
 
Zyl, P.V43 the author embodies transitional justice as an attempt to build a 
sustainable peace after conflict, mass violence or systemic human rights abuse. The 
author provides that transitional justice involves prosecuting perpetrators, revealing 
the truth about past crimes, providing victims with reparations, reforming abusive 
institutions and promoting reconciliation.44 The author provides that this require a 
comprehensive set of strategies that must deal with the events of the past but also a 
look to the future in order to prevent recurrence of conflict and abuse. Thus, 
transitional justice strategies are often crafted in situations where peace is fragile or 
perpetrators retain real power, they must carefully balance the demands of justice 
                                                            
40 Selim Y & Murith T, Transitional Justice and development: Partners for Sustainable Peace in 
Africa, 6 Journal of Peacebuilding2, 2011, at Pg. 66 
41See Also: United Nations Security Council ( UNSC), Report of the Secretary− General on the Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post− Conflict Societies, October 12, 2011, UN DOC. S/2011/634 at Para 10. 
Where since 2004 the Council has made references to the rule of law and transitional justice in well over 160 
resolutions, a marked increase over the same period prior to the 2004 report of the secretary− General, Available 
at https://www.un.org/rule of law/ files/S_2011_634EN.Pdf (Accessed on May 22, 2016). 
42 Ibid 
43 Zyl P. V, “ Promoting Transitional Justice in Post−Conflict Societies” in Alan B, and Heiner H (eds.), 
Security Governance in Post− Conflict Peace building, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces, Geneva, 2005.  Available at www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/indexf0e6.html? Paged=1883 (Accessed on 
May 12, 2016).  
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with the realities of what can be achieved in the short, medium and long term.45 
Therefore, in times of transition, some time the justice achieved does not necessarily 
correspond to an ideal of justice and it often represents of trade-off that it reached in 
order to score peace, or at least the silence of arms.46 Over the past decade, the field 
of transitional justice has expanded and evolved in two important respects.47 First, 
the elements of transitional justice have moved from being aspiration to embodying 
binding legal obligations.  
 
Where, international law particularly as articulated by bodies such as the European 
Court on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights and the Human 
Rights Committee has evolved over the past 20 years to the point where there are 
clear standards regarding state obligations in dealing with human rights abuse and 
correspondingly regarding clear prohibitions, for example, blanket amnesties for 
international crimes. This has been supported by over 100 countries signed and 
ratified the ICC statute48 which has both reinforced existing obligations and created 
new standards, by requiring each signatory to respond appropriately to human rights 
abuse or face action by the court. A further important development occurred in 
October 2004; when the UN Secretary General submitted a report to the Security 
Council setting out for the first time the UN’s approach to transitional justice issues 
in the post− conflict and transitional periods.49 This is an extremely important 
                                                            
45 Ibid 
46 Jalie B, Resistance to Transitional Justice Processes: A critical research agenda, 213, Pg. 4  
47 Supra note 42 
48 See htt:// ww.icc_cpi.int/asp/stateparties.html (for list of state parties to Rome Statute, 122 Ratifications as of 
15 February, 2013 ), Accessed on July 21, 2016. 
49 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Report of the Secretary−General on the Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post−Conflict Societies, August 24, 2004, UNDOC. S/ 2004/616, at Para 21( 
that while accounting for the past, building the rule of law and fostering democracy should be long term 
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development in both operational and normative terms. Second, the deepening of 
democracy in many parts of the world particularly Latin America, Asia, and Africa 
and the emergence of increasingly sophisticated civil society organisations with 
expertise in this area has contributed to creating both the institutions and political 
will required to deal with a legacy of human rights abuse and helped translate policy 
into action.50 This increased attention and commitment to transitional justice issues 
has been mirrored by the allocation of greater resources and international attention to 
post-conflict peace building. In which it requires sustainable interventions by both 
national and international actors on several different levels.51 Therefore, this is 
concede with the study at hand as the study seeks to find the better way to converge 
peace and justice for purpose of stopping conflict but on the other side would lead to 
observation of human rights. 
 
Mobbek, E52 the author examines issue of transitional justice in post-conflict 
societies has taken on increasing importance in the last few years. The author 
provides that in cases where there has been external intervention, there has also been 
some effort towards establishing different forms of transitional justice.53 These 
transitional justice mechanisms are essential to stability and sustainable peace. 
Transitional justice mechanisms are created to deal with crimes that were committed 
during a conflict period, at a stage where that society is at the point of transition from 
a society of conflict to one of democracy and peace.54 Hence, there are wide-ranging 
                                                            
50  Ibid, see Also Kai A, The Legal framework on Transitional Justice: A systematic Study with a special Focus 
on the Role of the ICC, Springer− Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, 2009, at Pg 34− 36. 
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52  E Mobbek, Transitional Justice in Post‒ Conflict Societies: Approach to Reconciliation, 2002  at Pg. 261 
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options available, to the transitional governments beyond which the dimensions of 
transition local factors affect the legitimacy of transitional responses.55 The author 
have analyzed transitional justice mechanisms that may take a number of forms56 
where most prominently of these include the international criminal court, 
international tribunals, special courts, truth commissions, local courts and traditional 
methods of justice.57 He has examined the forms of transitional justice, where local 
ownership can be more easily established. Therefore, experience from a number of 
cases, is build on the assumption that some form of transitional justice is essential for 
reconciliation, future stability and peace, and moreover it can serve to increase the 
sense of local ownership of the whole process of post-conflict reconstruction.58  
 
Furthermore, the author has given a guide on the means how transitional justice can 
be achieved in the post conflict and conflicting societies in which Burundi is among 
them. Therefore, the convergence between peace and justice is not a choice between 
one and another rather a plurality of complementary ways of reaching continued 
stability, peace and reconciliation.59 Thus the contemporary transitional justice model 
should be encompassed beyond rule of law models so as to overcome the dilemma of 
how to deal with past atrocities, especially genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity.60 African Union Panel of the Wise,61 this report proposes a draft Policy 
Framework on Transitional Justice for adoption by the relevant organs of the African 
Union (AU) and recommends an advocacy role for the Panel of the Wise in 
                                                            
55  R Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy” , 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 92,2003, at Pg. 93 
 
57 Supra note 50 
58 Ibid , at Pg. 262 
59 Ibid, at Pg. 279, 281 
60 Kuwali D, Just Peace: Achieving Peace, Justice, and Development in Post- Conflict Africa, Africa 
Peace building Network  Working Papers: No. 2, 2014, at Pg 1 
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promoting and reinforcing guiding principles on the rule of law and transitional 
justice across the African continent. Indeed, since the report was first drafted in 
2009, the AU has started a process for developing a clear and more coherent 
understanding of the contemporary application of transitional justice in Africa 
perhaps as another way of achieving justice through less violence means.62 This 
publication of the Panel of the Wise report broaden regional and international access 
to this research and its accompanying recommendations, and contribute to efforts by 
African and international actors to address the issue of non-impunity and its 
relationship with peace, justice, reconciliation, and healing as its main goals. 
 
Vandeginste, S63  the author provide that to enhance the inclusiveness of Burundi’s 
political dialogue, Ugandan president and East African Community mediator Yoweri 
Museveni suggested granting temporary immunity to Burundian opponents living in 
exile, some of whom are wanted by the government for their participation in the May 
2015 failed military coup attempt.64 While from a short-term conflict-settlement 
perspective this is a valuable suggestion, an analysis of Burundi’s previous 
experience with temporary immunities reveals some longer-term wicked effects. 
Including the following; First, temporary immunity turned out to be anything but 
temporary. Secondly, it created an incentive structure that discouraged Burundi’s 
elites from launching a transitional justice process. Thirdly, despite its initial 
purpose, it benefited both insurgents and incumbents. Fourthly, temporary immunity 
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63 Vandeginste S, Museveni, Burundi and the Perversity of Immunite´ Provisoire, 10International Journal of 
Transitional Justice3, 2016, Oxford University Press: London, 2016, Pg. 1–11, Available at 
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offered more than mere immunity to its beneficiaries. Finally, it was a stepping stone 
towards long-lasting impunity for human rights atrocities.65 These suggestions agree 
with the UN’s transitional justice approach towards post-conflict societies that 
temporary immunity may lead into repeated atrocities with same perverse effects.66 
Unfortunately, the debate on transitional justice does not focus on importance of 
development in post- conflict settings but rather on resolving the peace or justice 
debate. Therefore, if this gap in research and practice is not filled, the factors that 
cause conflict will remain unaddressed, thereby aggravating the suffering of the 
victim and endangering the fragile peace.67 Hence, this study underscores the 
prerequisites of transitional justice in post-conflict society.     
 
Ðukic, D68  the author provide that transitional justice encompasses a number of 
mechanisms that seek to allow post conflict societies to deal with past atrocities in 
circumstances of radical change. However, two of these mechanisms; truth 
commissions and criminal processes might clash if the former are combined with 
amnesties. The author examines the possibility of employing the Rome Statute’s 
Article 53 so as to allow these two mechanisms to operate in a complementary 
manner.69 He considers three arguments on interpretation of Article 53 in accordance 
with the relevant rules on treaty interpretation; states’ obligations to prosecute certain 
crimes and the Rome Statute’s approach to prosecutorial discretion. And he 
concludes that Article 53 is ill-suited to accommodate truth commissions in 
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conjunction with amnesties.70 These mechanisms also have been discussed in this 
study as the way to promote long-term reconciliation, peace, democracy, and most of 
all, deterrence.71 Rubli, S72 this paper is mainly based on extensive field research. 
The author provided a theoretical section explaining why transitional justice as a 
political process is negotiated among various actors and how the national 
consultations constitute such a negotiation arena. The description of the Burundian 
context of transitional justice is followed by a brief overview of the historical 
evolution of civil society in Burundi.73 The empirical part of the paper explores the 
role of civil society in the consultation process.  
 
Civil society has become an active player by forming an alliance between different 
local and international organisations, gaining specific knowledge on the topic of 
transitional justice, establishing contacts to the other decision-makers, and finally, by 
presenting themselves as the legitimate interlocutors to the population.74 The author 
conclude by putting the results into the context of the future transitional justice 
process in post conflicting Burundi which brings in the need to analyse mutual 
dichotomy of peace and justice in constitutional transformation and power sharing 
targeting on “how much should be achieved and when” rather than a choice between 
some and none.75 This is quite realistic observation because it is true finding 
experience that prosecution alone would be an incomplete form of justice, as it is 
noted that peace building contexts require a broad conception of transitional justice 
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that offers many avenues for accountability and justice.76 Salter, M and Huyse, L77 
the authors analysed and assessed the role and impact of traditional mechanisms in 
post-conflict settings. They aimed at addressing this gap by examining the role 
played by traditional justice mechanisms in dealing with the legacy of violent 
conflict in five African countries Rwanda, Mozambique, Uganda, Sierra Leone and 
Burundi. These case studies are used as the basis for outlining conclusions and 
options for future policy development.78 Their study was intended to serve both as a 
general knowledge resource and as a practitioner’s guide for national bodies seeking 
to employ traditional justice mechanisms as well as external agencies aiming to 
support such processes. 
 
It suggests that in some circumstances traditional mechanisms can effectively 
complement conventional judicial systems and represent a real potential for 
promoting justice, reconciliation and a culture of democracy.79 In addition, even in 
situations where communities are more inclined to demand straight forward 
retribution against the perpetrators, traditional justice mechanisms may still offer a 
way both of restoring a sense of accountability and of linking justice to democratic 
development.80 At the same time their study also cautions against unrealistic 
expectations of traditional structures. And it offers a restrained, evidence-based 
assessment of both the strengths and the weaknesses of traditional conflict 
management mechanisms within the broader framework of post-conflict social 
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reconstruction efforts more especially where peace processes does not end violent 
conflict.81 Hence, the same traditional methods have been considered in this study in 
peace seeking process. 
 
1.7   Research Methodology 
The research methodology is a way to systematically undertake the research study. It 
may be understood as a science of studying how research is done scientifically as its 
scope is wider than that of research methods.82 In research methodology the focus is 
not only on the research methods, but also the logic behind the methods used in the 
context of the research study and explaining why using a particular method or 
technique and why not using others so that research results are capable of being 
evaluated either by the researcher himself or by others.83 In this study, doctrinal type 
of legal research was used i.e. library based research methodology. 
 
The doctrinal legal research is concerned with the formulation of legal doctrines 
through the analysis of legal rules. Within the common law jurisdictions legal rules 
are to be found within statutes and cases but it is important to appreciate that they 
cannot, in themselves, provide a complete statement of the law in any given 
situation. This can only be ascertained by applying the relevant legal rules to the 
particular facts of the situation under consideration.84 The Doctrinal legal research is 
therefore concerned with the discovery and development of legal doctrines for 
publication in textbooks or journal articles. In this case different university libraries 
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were accessed, such as the Open University of Tanzania, University of Dar es 
Salaam and the general cross reference to various articles and journals, and report 
documents found on electronic information available on online libraries played a 
great role to our research study. However, there were very few helpful books or 
literature85 from University of Dar es Salaam library, as most of them were found to 
be on the general understanding of international criminal law and not on an aspect of 
transitional justice. This was the same even to Open University at Kinondoni 
Campus. Therefore, this study relied mostly on online libraries. 
 
1.8   Scope and Area of the Study 
This study is confined in Burundi as the post conflict society. This is because the 
region is among the African states that have a current conflicts experience. Where 
being in conflict there have been some violations of Human Rights as different 
groups keep on fighting against the government regime. This study aimed at 
obtaining relevant information toward rebuilding a way to peaceful society which 
will be free from conflict. 
 
1.9   Research Analysis Process 
The doctrinal legal research mandates the study to locate the required apt statutory 
provisions and judicial reflections thereon that have bearing on the legal doctrine, 
concept or rule under inquiry. Such legislative provisions and judicial decisions 
constitute the basic data for a doctrinal legal researcher. The basic tools of a doctrinal 
legal researcher are: statutory materials, case reports, standard textbooks and 
reference books, legal periodicals, Parliamentary Debates and Government Reports. 
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In this study the analysis based on the examination of statutory materials, standard 
textbooks and reference books and government reports. 
 
1.10   Limitation 
No study is open-handed and without limitations.86 There is no perfect research 
designs as there are always trade-offs.87 These are as explained hereunder: First, 
analysis of the legal principle, doctrine under inquiry, in particular, and of law in 
general, and the consequential projections of the doctrinal researcher, ultimately, 
become subjective and exhibit his perception about the inquired subject-matter. A 
different perception of the same legal principle, concept, doctrine or law by another 
scholar or scholars of law, therefore, cannot be ruled out.88 In other words, doctrinal 
legal research, depending upon the reasoning power and analytical skills of the 
researcher, may lead to different perceptions and projections of the same legal fact, 
concept or doctrine when different scholars of law analyse it. Thus, different scholars 
may perceive a legal fact or doctrine differently with equally convincing logical 
reasoning. 
 
Secondly, in doctrinal legal researcher, gathers the policy from his own experience, 
authoritative statutory materials, case reports, and his reflections thereon. His inquiry 
into a legal principle or concept or law, therefore, does not get any support from 
social facts or values. His research, undeniably, becomes merely theoretical and 
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devoid of any social facts. Consequently, his projections of law and predictions 
regarding changes in the law are bound to be far from social reality and inadequate.89  
Hence, when law is viewed as an effective instrument of socio-economic 
transformation, it becomes necessary to see law in the light of social facts and values. 
It also needs to be studied and analysed in terms of its actual working and 
consequences and not as it stands in the book. Therefore, in this context doctrinal 
legal research becomes inadequate and inappropriate.  
 
Furthermore, contemporary social-goal-oriented law requires pre-legislative study to 
know and appreciate the extra-legal factors that have played significant role, positive 
or negative, in shaping the legal rule or doctrine in the present form.90 Whereby, the 
doctrinal legal research, by its nature, does not bring such pre-legislative issues in its 
ambit. 
 
Thirdly, the doctrinal legal research does not involve a study of the factors that lie 
outside law or legal system but have directly or indirectly influenced the operation of 
the law, a legal rule, concept or doctrine. Sometimes the prevailing stakes and 
prejudices of a dominant social group may hamper the law’s operation and success. 
A study of such extra-legal factors, interests and prejudices, therefore, becomes 
necessary for understanding their role and contribution in making the law or doctrine 
effective, less effective or ineffective in its operation. Such a study also becomes 
desirable, rather inevitable, to devise appropriate legislative or policy-oriented 
measures to do away with the factors that are desisting/have desisted the law to be 
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effective or to minimize their adverse effects on the law’s performance. The doctrinal 
legal research practically overlooks the need to study these factors. Fourthly, the 
doctrinal legal researcher puts his sole reliance on, and gives prominence to, 
traditional sources of law and judicial pronouncements of appellate courts.91 The 
actual practice and attitude of lower courts and of administrative agencies with quasi-
judicial powers, whose judgments remain unreported, are left unexplored in doctrinal 
legal research. 
 
 1.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked on the background of the problem, statement of the problem 
which is the heart of this study, then the objectives and significance of the study. 
Further, there is research methodology. In this study doctrinal research was 
employed and later taken a comparative look at limitations of doctrinal legal research 
as has been explained above, the doubt about value and relevance of doctrinal legal 
research was appreciated, through legal analysis of statutory provisions and cases, 
revolves around legal principles and doctrines. In this study a review of literature has 
shown that the concept of transitional justice sustains a broad concept of peace with 
diversified justice interests. Hence there are so many challenges to count in post− 
conflict situation where prosecution could obstruct peace process.92  
 
As noted the current practice from the vast literature review, it suffers from a lack of 
clear rules and criteria which could help to reconcile peace and justice in situations 
of transition. Thus, focusing on problems of legitimacy and accountability, it is found 
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that the existing prosecutorial mechanisms also have a limited and unsatisfying 
perspective93 as it can be reaffirmed that peace initiations which sacrifice justice 
more than often fail to produce stable peace.94  
 
This study therefore, underscores a slight aspect that have not widely acknowledged 
and on other hand wrongly perceived by most of the scholars in this field. The 
following chapter will be on the theoretical and legal framework of peace and justice. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2.0   THEORETICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PEACE AND 
JUSTICE 
2.1  Introduction   
The chapter discusses the theoretical and conceptual framework on Transitional 
Justice, the elements of Transitional Justice which includes: Criminal Prosecutions, 
Truth Commissions, Reparations, Institutional Reforms and Traditional Methods of 
Justice. Further, there is the concept of Justice and the concept of Peace and lastly 
providing general summary of the chapter.  
 
2.2 The Concept of Transitional Justice 
The term was first coined in the early 1990’s and has since came to describe an ever 
expanding range of mechanisms and institutions, including tribunals, truth, truth 
commissions, memorial projects, reparations and the like to redress past wrongs, 
vindicate the dignity of victims and  provide justice in times of transitional.95 In a 
broader context the term refers on how societies are transitioning from repressive 
rule or armed conflict deal with past atrocities, how they overcome social divisions 
or seek reconciliation, and how they create justice system so as to prevent future 
human rights violations.96  Apart from the given definition above, the United Nations 
Secretary General, in his 2004 report on transitional justice and rule of law, has given 
a comprehensive definition for transitional justice as ‘the full range of processes and 
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mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of 
large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with 
differing levels of international involvement or none at all and individual 
prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, 
or a combination thereof.’97  
 
The essence of transitional justice under this is the balancing of the immediate need 
to secure peace with longer term imperatives to establish the rule of law and prevent 
future conflicts. It includes short, medium and long term local, regional, and interna-
tional programs that address the peace, reconciliation, and justice needs of the 
affected populations, prevent escalation of conflicts, prevent further victimization, 
avoid relapse into violence, combat impunity, foster social justice and democratic 
participation, and strengthen progress towards the consolidation of peace.98 
 
2.3   The Elements of Transitional Justice 
The range of transitional justice methods includes individual prosecutions; truth 
seeking; reparations which includes work on memory, memorials, and 
memorialisation; and institutional reform which includes vetting and dismissal of 
staff.99 Further, there is a traditional method of justice form a significant and growing 
area in this field. These methods have been elaborated below. 
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2.3.1   Criminal Prosecutions 
The development of international law has entailed unrelenting pressure from 
concerned citizens and human rights groups to ensure that individuals responsible for 
grave human rights violations face the possibility of prosecution and punishment. 
Prosecution has often been part of efforts to close the impunity gap, restore the rule 
of law, and build a culture of human rights.100 The evolution of international justice 
has led to the creation of a complex set of strategies to deal with massive human 
rights violations in political environments where actors are either not prepared to 
confront them or are resistant to punishment.101  
 
As noted already, international law is clear about the category of crimes for which 
there can be no amnesty. In addition, there may be domestic legal constraints, such as 
constitutional provisions, that may make it difficult to secure amnesty. This is 
certainly true for those countries that have domesticated a plethora of international 
and human rights treaties, including 121 countries that are now party to the ICC’s 
Rome Statute. Regardless of what national provisions are adopted, international law 
precludes amnesty for the most serious international crimes, defined as crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.102 
 
2.3.2   Truth Commissions 
Truth commissions are justice mechanisms that address the root causes of conflict 
and offer recommendations for dealing with impunity. The truth commissions have 
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become a means to investigate past human rights violations, uncover the repressive 
machinery of authoritarian regimes, and identify systemic socioeconomic 
injustices.103 These commissions have approached truth seeking in various ways that 
are frequently influenced by their institutional design. Those endowed with subpoena 
power and large staffs are typically more able to access information, while those 
empowered to name perpetrators are more likely to secure at least a symbolic 
measure of accountability. If they have the power to grant amnesty, they risk 
devolving into institutions that actually support impunity. Example, the South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission offered a conditional amnesty in 
exchange for full disclosure of crimes, but the power to grant amnesty has histori-
cally been rare among truth commission.104  
 
Truth commissions have their limitations as they require sustained funding and 
political support to be effective, and there is a real danger that they are increasingly 
seen as a panacea, inserted into peace agreements in order to provide options for 
leaders seeking to avoid criminal accountability.105 Generally, the truth commissions 
have a powerful effect when used appropriately and effectively. Once conducted in 
consultation with local actors, they have the potential to contribute to stability, 
building a just society, and laying the foundations for deepening the rule of law. At 
their best, truth commissions can produce influential investigative accounts of human 
rights violations while providing victims with at least symbolic reparations and 
accountability. They can support wider peace building efforts example in Sierra 
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Leone, strengthen human rights standards and propose recommendations that address 
critical issues of institutional reform by taking an example in South Africa.106 Their 
findings may not lead to criminal accountability, but if they name perpetrators, 
human rights activists can campaign to prevent these perpetrators from taking up 
future positions in government. Thus, when properly executed, truth commissions 
can be one among a host of mechanisms for restoring the rule of law.107 
 
2.3.4   Reparations 
The reparations focus on victims and form a critical transitional justice mechanism 
for repairing relations between national actors and victims. The UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) accords reparations a special place 
among transitional justice measures, even as it recognizes the necessary 
interconnectedness of those measures.108 The right to reparation is well established in 
international law and it is found in several multilateral treaties and is now accepted 
as part of customary international law.  
 
The United Nations General Assembly, in a resolution outlining principles on the 
right to remedy and reparation, named five components of the right to reparation.109 
The first is restitution which involves returning the victim to his or her situation 
before the crime was committed and the second is compensation which involves 
payment for economically measurable damage. The third component is rehabilitation 
through general medical or social assistance and then the fourth is satisfactions 
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which comprise a broad group of measures that includes access to justice and truth 
seeking; and lastly is guarantees of non-repetition. Just as they are most useful when 
paired with other truth and accountability mechanisms, reparations are a step toward 
truth and justice for victims: they recognize victims as persons unfairly harmed and 
entitled to compensation. The recognition of victimhood is an important symbolic 
component of any reparations program. In this sense, truth commissions and 
prosecutions are also agents of symbolic reparations.110  
 
2.3.5   Institutional Reforms 
A comprehensive transitional justice approach both identifies individual perpetrators 
and looks closely at structural deficiencies in institutions that allow for human rights 
abuses. Institutional reform refers to a broad range of initiatives that aim to re-
establish the rule of law, a functioning state bureaucracy, and democratic norms in 
post-authoritarian or post conflict countries.111 Common reforms encompass both 
non-criminal forms of accountability through vetting and lustration programs, and 
the re-establishment of the rule of law through judicial and constitutional reform. 
Either types of activity serve the same purpose, or are at least mutually reinforcing in 
which vetting civil service officials reinforces the rule of law, and judicial reforms 
may facilitate accountability for officials complicit in corruption or human rights 
violations. Vetting of public services provide one direct way to clean public 
administrations of officials responsible for crimes or those associated with a past 
regime.112  
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2.3.6   Traditional Methods of Justice 
Traditional methods of justice can take many different forms, and vary extensively 
from community to community. They are generally considered restorative justice, 
but they can also have punitive functions. However, on a broad and general level 
they are mechanisms for solving disputes, conflicts and crime at the community 
level. It is where a village or tribal council, community meeting or council of elders 
is held to deal with crimes perpetrated towards the community or individuals, or it 
can focus on resolving conflicts such as marital disputes and domestic violence. The 
council, elders or group then decide on the punishment for the perpetrator.113 
 
The punishment can vary extensively depending upon not only the seriousness of the 
crime or transgression, but also on the culture of the country and community. It can 
include public humiliation of the perpetrator, paying fines, community labour, 
physical punishment or what the community or council determines to be the best 
solution for the transgression. It is often focused on the fact that the perpetrator is 
part of the community and although he or she can be punished for the crimes 
committed, it is not in the sense of incarceration. The perpetrator may serve the 
community and repay for his or her crimes. This serves the greater good of the 
community rather than separating the perpetrator from the community.114 The 
different variations of traditional justice mechanisms are used all over the world in 
developing countries. Where there have been long periods of conflict, authoritarian 
regimes or where the judicial system is perceived to be unfair and corrupt, they are 
                                                            
113 Supra  note 39, pg. Pg. 282 
114 Ibid. 
34 
 
 
 
sometimes used more extensively, because of a lack of trust in the system.115Unlike 
truth commissions and the type of ad hoc or hybrid local trials discussed above these 
mechanisms are in constant use for present crimes and conflict resolution, they are 
not a mechanism created or developed to deal particularly with past crimes of human 
rights abuse in a post conflict setting. They can be a valuable mechanism to use in 
the context of post-conflict transitional justice because of their focus on 
reconciliation and their both restorative and retributive nature.116  However, several 
cautionary notes must be struck before unequivocally embracing all traditional 
mechanisms in all their forms as ways of dealing with past crimes. The cautionary of 
traditional mechanisms frequently rely on the denying the perpetrator the rights of a 
fair trial. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) has 
pointed out,  
 
‘it is recognised that traditional courts are capable of playing a role in the 
achievement of peaceful societies and exercise authority over a significant 
proportion of the population of African countries. However, traditional 
courts are not exempt from the provisions of the African Charter relating to a 
fair trial.117  
 
Therefore, not only the trial, but also the punishments meted out can be against 
international human rights law and standards. For example, in Rwanda, one of the 
judges of the Gacaca trials was accused of having used a machete to cut the thigh of 
a young woman because she had refused to sleep with him, the judge admitted this 
act and explained that ‘it was ok’ because she then ‘agreed’ to live with him.118 The 
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level of agreement versus that of enforcement is here questionable at best. The ability 
of some traditional mechanisms to deal with large-scale human rights abuse, because 
of their own non-adherence to international standards of human rights, is extremely 
problematic. However, for all its shortcomings, the implementation of the Gacaca 
courts in Rwanda, a local dispute settlement mechanism to address the legacy of the 
genocide, is recognized world-wide as an emblematic experience and ambitious 
exercise in mobilizing traditional justice in post-conﬂict societies.119  
 
Also other countries have mobilized traditional mechanisms of conﬂict resolution in 
post conﬂict processes. The most well-known examples are the mato oput rituals, 
part of the Acholi justice system in northern Uganda, and the incorporation of 
traditional leaders in the truth and reconciliation commissions in Sierra Leone and 
Timor-Leste. Even Koﬁ Annan, as then UN Secretary-General, oﬃcially 
acknowledged that: ‘due regard must be given to indigenous and informal traditions 
for administering justice or settling disputes, to help them to continue their vital role 
and to do so in conformity with both international standards and local tradition’.120 
On the other hand International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and donor 
countries have supported and even promoted those traditional justice instruments.121  
However, it is remarked that: it is common place to hear that culture and context 
matter, and that any intervention peace-building or otherwise must be culturally 
sensitive.122 
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2.4 The Concept of Justice 
Justice is the impartial resolution of disputes arising from conflicting claims.123It 
implies the fair and proper administration of laws. Therefore for the United Nations, 
justice is an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of 
rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs. Justice implies regard for the 
rights of the accused, for the interests of victims and for the well-being of society at 
large.  
 
It is a concept rooted in all national cultures and traditions and, while its 
administration usually implies formal judicial mechanisms, traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms are equally relevant. The international community has 
worked to articulate collectively the substantive and procedural requirements for the 
administration of justice for more than half a century.124 Thus it seems natural to 
think of the concept of justice as distinct from the various conceptions of justice and 
as being specified by the role which these different sets of principles and conceptions 
have in common.125 
 
2.5 The Concept of Peace 
There are various definitions of peace appear in the literature, yet there is no 
consensus on a conceptually clear definition to guide researchers in developing 
measurement procedures and indicators.126 This study proposes the definition of 
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peace and develops the guidelines within the parameters of transitional justice in 
which peace is defined as a two-dimensional construct with both objective and 
subjective measures that must be studied within specific context. Therefore, Peace 
includes the absence of war,127 but much more. It is the absence of violence in all of 
its forms and the presence of mutually beneficial cooperation and mutual learning.128 
Peace has eight components, where the absence of these four forms of violence is 
negative peace and the presence of activities to bring relief for past or present 
violence and to prevent future violence that is positive peace.  
 
These components of peace include the following; the first component requires the 
absence of direct violence: ceasefires, disarmament, prevention of terrorism and state 
terrorism, non-violence. The second emphasise on providing a life-enhancing 
cooperation and prevention of direct violence: peace-building, conflict 
transformation, reconciliation and reconstruction.  
 
Third component base on humanitarian aid, food aid, alleviation of poverty and 
misery and fourth is on building a life-sustaining economy at the local, national and 
global level in which everyone’s basic needs are met.  While the fifth on liberation 
from oppression, occupation, dictatorship and ensuring good governance and 
participation, self-determination and human rights.129 And the sixth component base 
on overcoming prejudice based on nationality, race, language, gender, age, class, 
religion, and seventh on elimination of the glorification of war and violence in the 
media, literature, films, monuments, as well as the eight to promote of a culture of 
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peace and mutual learning; global communication and dialogues; development of 
peaceful deep cultures and deep structures; peace education; peace and journalism.130 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter have looked on different mechanisms or processes that transitional 
societies may use to address past human rights wrongs caused by conflict, repressive 
rule or state failure and includes both judicial and non-judicial approaches like trials, 
truth commissions, memorials and institutional reform initiatives.  
 
Therefore, transitional societies have attempted various approaches to serve justice 
and to attain either individual or collective accountability for the past human rights 
violations. These approaches are seen to clarify the human rights records, identify 
victims and perpetrators, to provide reparations to the former and prosecute the latter. 
Hence the main issue of this Chapter will be featured in the next Chapter about the 
convergence of peace and justice in transitional justice of law and practice which will 
discuss in details on how the elements of transitional justice can be called upon in 
regard to the situation in Burundi. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.0       CONVERGENCE OF PEACE AND JUSTICE IN TRANSITIONAL                                                                                                            
                                         JUSTICE: LAW AND PRACTICE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The concept of transitional justice is problematic since there is often no clarity 
regarding the nature or length of the transition. This problem stems in part from the 
fact that a number of countries with transitional justice mechanisms are usually in 
situations of on-going armed conflict. In addition, transitional justice is no longer 
limited to moments of transition from authoritarianism to democracy or war to peace.  
Although transitional justice can be pursued in various contexts, the underlying 
objective is to find goals that strengthen stability and diminish opportunities for 
impunity.131 
 
The transitional justice has several overlapping goals: to establish the truth about the 
past; end impunity for past and continuing human rights violations; achieve 
compensation for the victims of those violations; build a culture of the rule of law; 
lay the foundation for long-term reconciliation and political transformation; and 
prevent the recurrence of such abuses in the future.132 These goals correspond to 
numerous obligations on states contained in domestic constitutions, international 
human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and 
international refugee law, as well as the Charter of the United Nations, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and other regional instruments. These 
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instruments together form the core norms and standards of transitional justice, 
including the duty to prosecute, the right to the truth, and the right to remedy and 
reparations. 
 
3.2 Transitional Justice and International Criminal Court 
The development in the International community’s long struggle to advance the 
cause of justice and rule of law was the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). The Rome Statute133 entered into force only on 1 July 2002, yet the 
Court is already having an important impact by putting would-be violators on notice 
that impunity is not assured and serving as a catalyst for enacting national laws 
against the gravest international crimes.  
 
Hence, it is now crucial that the international community ensures that this nascent 
institution has the resources, capacities, information and support it needs to 
investigate, prosecute and bring to trial those who bear the greatest responsibility for 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, in situations where national 
authorities are unable or unwilling to do so.134 On the other hand the Security 
Council has a particular role to play in this regard, empowered as it is to refer 
situations to the ICC, even in cases where the countries concerned are not States 
parties to the Statute of the Court.135 Although, Burundi has recently withdrawn from 
the ICC since 26 October 2017, still it will not affect the capacity of the OTP to 
request the opening of a formal investigation because a state had a duty to cooperate 
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nor it shall not prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which 
was already under consideration by the court prior to the date in which the 
withdrawal became effective as provided under Article 127(2) of the Rome statute.136  
As there are no timelines provided in the Rome statute for a decision on a 
preliminary examination, it just depends on the facts and circumstances of each 
situation.  
 
This is clear under Article 13(a) of the Rome statute which require either a situation 
to be referred to the prosecutor by a state party in accordance to Article 14, which 
require the prosecutor to investigate the situation once requested so as to determine 
the persons to be charged with the commission of such crimes137 or the prosecutor to 
initiate an investigation proprio motu on the basis of ‘information’ received by 
reliable sources as provided under Article 13(c) in accordance with Article 15 of the 
Rome statute. Meaning that the investigation of a situation referred to by a state party 
or the Security Council is the sole responsibility of the prosecutor, but if the 
prosecutor acts proprio motu the decision to proceed with an investigation must be 
authorised by the pre- trial chamber.138  Thus, the Pre – Trial Chamber III of the ICC 
has now authorised the prosecutor to open an investigation regarding crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the court allegedly committed in Burundi or by nationals of 
Burundi outside Burundi since 26 April 2015 until 26 October 2017 as the state was 
party from the moment the statute entered into effect for Burundi (i.e. 1st December 
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2004) up to when the withdrawal became effective.139 However, in the light of the 
scale of the crimes under international law that have been committed with impunity 
in Burundi, it should be noted that Burundi has ratified a range of human right 
treaties, including the ICCPR (1990), ICESCR (1990), CAT (1993), and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1989). Also, the Constitution of Burundi 
recognises the right to life (Article 24), the right to be free from torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment (Article 25) and guarantees the 
independence of the courts (Article 209). Burundi is a member of Human Rights 
Council and was a member of the Council when Resolution A/HRC/S-24/1 which 
established UNIIB was adopted, by consensus.140 Hence, Burundi carries the primary 
responsibility to respect, protect and ensure human rights to all people within her 
jurisdiction.141 
 
Ironically, Burundi becomes the first nation to leave the ICC after the initial embrace 
by some of African leaders, where the relations between the ICC and African states 
have become increasingly strained by concerns that it has pursued a selective 
approach to justice by primarily targeting Africans while ignoring other international 
crimes perpetrated by powerful nations or their allies. These have opened the court to 
allegations of neo-colonialism; in fact, the court’s main detractors in Africa see it as 
a tool of Western hypocrisy and double standards. Other critics charge that the 
court’s retributive justice devalues traditional methods of dispute resolution that 
                                                            
139 Fadi El Abdllah, ICC Judges authorize opening of an Investigation regarding Burundi Situation, 
Public Affairs Unit, ICC, Press Release, November 9, 2017.Available at https://www.icc-cp.int 
,Accessed on  January 12, 2018  
140 Supra note 90, at Para 14 &15 
141 Ibid 
43 
 
 
 
emphasize restorative justice.142 These criticisms have coincided with growing 
disillusion about the workings of the court among the court’s key allies in Africa’s 
civil society and victims’ groups. Although strongly supportive of the ICC, they were 
part of the global campaign to strengthen international justice these actors have been 
frustrated by the court’s direction, prosecutorial policies and strategies, excessive 
procedural delays, and insufficient evidence for charges, as well as the inadequate 
participation of victims. The procedural and policy issues raised by victims’ groups 
and their supporters in civil society do raise concerns and require further analysis.143 
The international justice building is thus perceived to be at loggerheads with Africa 
in a manner that may potentially threaten the pursuit of peace and justice. 
 
3.3     United Charter on Peoples’ Rights 
The UN charter protects peoples’ rights through legal instruments and on several 
activities. Also different intergovernmental bodies and interdepartmental 
mechanisms based at the UN address a range of human rights protections144 to ensure 
that sustainable peace and accountability through appropriate transitional justice is 
well achieved.145 On the other hand the Charter empowers the Security Council to 
take necessary measures to maintain peace or restore international peace and 
security.146 Furthermore, the development of the concept of responsibility to protect 
(RtoP) ensure that states are institutionalized and reinforcing the sovereign 
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responsibilities of the state in protecting its citizens.147 This mean that states can 
prevent the occurrence of responsibility to protect crimes within their territory hence 
adoption of resolution 63/308/2009 by the General Assembly during the world 
summit is one of the example which promote nations adopting targeted measures to 
prevent atrocity crimes tailored to the national context.148 In this context it can be 
seen that Burundi has been reluctant to cooperate with the AU and it is even noted 
that during the UNIIB visit several government officials were not in a position to 
provide information. The response considered in a blanket denial of all violations.149 
 
3.4 Regional Overview of Transitional Justice 
The process of ending impunity has become a collective international enterprise to 
promote justice, reduce human suffering, and foster amity within and across 
societies. The International instruments dealing with impunity have evolved 
alongside the gradual diminution of sovereign rights of states, raising profound 
questions about the locus of action and responsibility that have blurred the traditional 
division of efforts between national and the international actors.150 Thus, the 
consensus on fighting impunity has, in part, been hindered by the sovereignty claims 
between nations and international community, morality, and rights.151But there are 
remarkable growing realization that solid institution which restrain justice and 
reconciliation within the broader framework of democracy and the rule of law are the 
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weapons for fighting impunity across the nations. Hence, international instruments 
against impunity have become smoothed because of the intensification of atrocities 
and in circumstances where civil wars have ravaged the institutions of justice and 
reconciliation.152 This is due to a long time experience with wars and violence in 
Africa with strident attempts to remedy the culture of impunity at the national, 
regional, and continental levels. Hence, one of the cornerstones of the AU’s 
principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, are joint efforts against 
impunity enshrined in the organization’s charter and the AU Constitutive Act153 to 
give moral and political weight to African states. 
 
The AU Constitutive Act pledges to fight impunity, but there is a need to draw 
lessons from the various experiences across African in the articulation of a set of 
common concepts and principles that would guide consensus on continental and sub-
regional instruments. Part of these initiatives would entail exploration of measures to 
develop and deepen the AU’s capacity for assessing the goals and limitations of 
various accountability measures to respond to impunity.154 These efforts could 
culminate in a continental strategic policy framework on transitional justice that 
balances the imperatives of peace and justice in conflict and post conflict contexts. 
Such a policy would provide the AU with the occasion to respond appropriately to 
the difficult problems of balancing the immediate need to secure peace with the 
longer term importance of establishing the rule of law and preventing future 
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conflicts.155 Therefore, most part of the AU’s human rights crusade reflected in the 
struggle against impunity and the quest for justice and reconciliation seek to 
legitimize various national efforts that have grappled with building democracies, the 
rule of law, and functional judicial systems with an appearance of impartiality.156 
Equally vital, the AU has embraced declarations against impunity to propagate this 
norm of justice and reconciliation within its multiple institutions and sub-regional 
bodies, such as the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). 
 
Hence, the African experiences of managing impunity via justice and reconciliation 
disclose the importance of institutional innovations that give prominence to 
participation, impartiality, and the search for truth and healing. The national 
transitional justice institutions, such as truth and reconciliation commissions, have 
worked where there is a decisive departure from institutions and practices that 
underwrite impunity and criminalize organized dissent. The AU as noted for example 
has adopted a wide range of legal instruments aimed at addressing significant human 
security objectives.157 It could be said that the challenge in Africa has been on 
creation of stable institutions that balance reconciliation with justice in the context of 
broadening political, social, and economic freedoms. African attempts to deal with 
justice and reconciliation have reinforced significant principles and norms, in 
particular the importance of public participation, public hearings, and the restoration 
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of civic trust; the right to the truth and reparations for victims; all focusing on 
institutional reforms.158 Furthermore, questions of impunity, justice, and 
reconciliation in Africa have been increasingly mediated by international actors and 
institutions, some of which are not perceived to be fair, impartial, and just. The 
emergence of the ICC as the embodiment of international legality on impunity has 
occasioned deep debates about the prosecution of crimes and atrocities by 
individuals, irrespective of status and standing. Thirty three of African states are 
signatories to the Rome Statue that created the ICC and some have made efforts to 
establish enabling legislation to implement its provisions. 
 
Although the concerns of some African states about the selective application of 
international justice will not diminish, there is widespread consensus, especially 
among the citizens of the continent, on the core underpinnings in the fight against 
impunity.159 The results of the ICC’s judicial intervention both positive and negative 
are reverberating across Africa. The impact of the ICC, under it’s complementarily 
clause, has propelled some innovative domestic judicial and non-judicial approaches 
to dealing with impunity. In the same vein, it is apparent that international justice is 
at a crossroads in Africa.160 However, to overcome this diverging about international 
justice in Africa it is important to entrench African values in international 
accountability mechanisms; and harmonize the global search for peace, justice, and 
reconciliation. The above discussed aspects relate much to the advocacy of the Panel 
of the Wise and also the African initiatives for strengthening instruments of justice 
and reconciliation undertaken in part of this study 
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3.5 United Nations Security Council’s outlook on Burundi 
It should be noted that TJ is passing through a worrying steps in Burundi because the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission was still preparing for public hearings and 
collective forgiveness addressing crimes committed between 1962 and 2008 when 
the country engulfed into 2015 crisis,161 meaning that the mechanisms must have 
paralysed as for now. However, it is noted that in 12 November 2015 the United 
Nations Security Council had called on all parties Burundi to engage in peace talks, 
warning of further actions against those who incite more violence and also adopted a 
resolution calling on government to protect human rights and cooperate with regional 
African mediators to immediately convene “an inclusive and genuine inter- 
Burundian dialogue” to find a peaceful resolution of the crisis that had occurred.162  
 
In January 2016, the High Commissioner for Human Rights appointed experts to 
undertake the United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB) into 
violations and abuses of human rights with a view to preventing further deterioration 
of the human rights situation 163 and it is noted that the government has been 
cooperative by that time when the UNIIB has compiled a list of alleged perpetrators 
who were repeatedly named by victims and witnesses as responsible for gross human 
rights violations.164 However, it is surprising that the resolution which also involved 
sending 228 UN Police to monitor the security and human rights situation in 
Burundi, it has not been implemented despite acknowledging the high risk of atrocity 
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crimes in Burundi and the UNSC is still divided over a course of action.165  
Therefore, a critical analyse should suppose a similar outlook adopted by the 
Security Council when establishing the ICTR and ICTY, in which a link shows that a 
tribunal could be established in Burundi upon justification that there were atrocities 
committed during the post- election crisis so as to provide satisfaction of those who 
were mostly  injured by those crimes.166 
 
3.6       Peace and Justice in the Process of Transitional Justice 
Peace without justice cannot be sustainable. It is a dreadful mistake to believe that 
people will simply forget. Even after a hundred years, unpunished crimes continue to 
signify huge stumbling blocks in establishing peaceful, normal relations between 
states.167Although there is currently a growing consensus of the nexus between peace 
and justice, for example the UN Secretary General has emphasised the importance of 
integrating justice into the peace process.168 
 
If peace being dissociated from social justice does not address the fundamental 
structural causes of war.169 The post conflict reconstruction faces the deep social 
inequalities that are common in and endemic to many divided and impoverished 
countries. Where, political instability is inherent in the failure to reduce gross 
inequalities and in the lack of policies on poverty reduction. And formal methods of 
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representation and institutional procedures can be a contentious issue without 
addressing power differentials among social groups and classes. Hence, the 
development of people's capacity to influence social structures and political 
processes has to go hand in hand with empowerment of the marginal sectors of 
society.170 
 
The durable peace could not be achieved without the establishment of local, state, 
regional and international systems of procedural and distributive justice.171 
Procedural and distributive justice can be complementary to each other in the way 
that participatory mechanisms allow identity groups to express their needs and 
grievances in a constructive manner. In addition, forming political entities of 
multiethnic and multicultural configurations would require respect for greater 
autonomy and diversity in which dominant groups need to be convinced that their 
own long-term security interests are served by the promotion of a just society.172 
 
In this regard, the discussions of transitional justice in Africa focus on how to attain 
peace and ensure accountability during negotiations, raising the controversial 
question of whether peace and justice are competitive or complementary goals. Two 
incorrect assumptions underlie these discussions. The first is the narrow view that 
assumes that peace processes are solely about ending violent conflicts and the second 
is the tendency to perceive justice in terms of retributive justice that is, prosecution 
or criminal accountability.173  
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However, these extreme positions ignore the intimate links between peace and 
justice. It should be acknowledged that a more accurate conception should treats 
peace and justice as fundamental to ending violence and preventing its recurrence. In 
which most mediators recognize that building a durable peace involves addressing 
the underlying causes and sources of violent conflict. Along with concerns about 
competition for power, marginalization, and identity, most conflicts are outcomes of 
the flagrant injustices and human rights abuses committed by elites and state 
institutions, taking examples of indictments and prosecutions helping secure peace 
by removing spoilers from the peace process, such as in the former Yugoslavia, often 
both peace and justice cannot be achieved at the same time.174 
 
Nevertheless with advances in international legal obligations and an increasingly 
sophisticated international justice building, mediators can no longer ignore questions 
of justice. In the quest for justice, the UN has established a binding rule prohibiting 
its officials from granting amnesties for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
genocide.175 It was for this reason that the UN envoy to Sierra Leone, at the time of 
the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord, appended the UN’s refusal to accept the amnesty 
clause to the accord that the government and rebels signed. This gesture paved the 
way for a policy that has influenced subsequent mediation by national, regional, and 
international actors.176 Further, overcoming the tensions between peace and justice 
entails sequencing justice activities, as demonstrated in Argentina in the 1980s can 
be taken as a cooperative case to this study. Although it was not facing on-going 
armed conflict, Argentina confronted the dangers of a transition from military 
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dictatorship to democracy. The successive democratic governments from 1983 took 
gradual steps in building peace and justice that involved a mixture of punishment of 
and amnesty for military officers implicated in human rights abuses during the period 
of military rule.177 Therefore, the Argentinean experience reveals that while political 
realities complicated the search for accountability, multiple truth-seeking initiatives 
continually exposed perpetrators, and a vigilant array of victims’ groups and civil 
society organizations kept the demand for justice alive. In addition, Argentina’s 
victims’ groups used international and regional instruments at critical moments to 
pressure their government to act. In the end, receptive governments with favourable 
political climate made the pursuit of justice possible.178  
 
Similarly, Argentina’s neighbours Uruguay and Chile set justice aside temporarily 
when their militaries, including previous dictators, threatened reprisals against 
civilian governments that tried to pursue accountability. But these actions did not 
lessen public demands for justice, and as the case of General Augusto Pinochet in 
Chile illustrates, justice finally prevailed.179 These Latin American experiences 
demonstrate that peace and justice are compatible and that a variety of accountability 
mechanisms can be pursued over time in the search for sustainable peace. 
Subsequently, they do demand a comprehensive strategy of implementation basing 
on equal, mutually-reinforcing, and non-sequential pillar of states in the fulfilment of 
their responsibility to protect.180  Therefore, in sequencing and strategic planning 
justice, it should be considered that peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive 
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objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives.181 Hence, in response to these 
considerations, there is no transitional justice model approach that can easily be 
transferred from one situation to another. It is just a post- conflict situation that 
determines.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The recovery of a fractured community increases its ability to change the dynamics 
of the cycle of conflict. Peace building ultimately has to focus on problems attributed 
to original and new sources of serious conflict. The reconstruction of a broken social 
and human structure in a war shattered region has to be geared toward promoting 
human well-being and social justice, which constitute positive peace. Social 
empowerment and trust building improve the chances of successful reconstruction. 
Therefore, from what has been discussed in this chapter, the following chapter will 
confine itself in Burundi as a post conflicting state and as the case study of the 
research by giving the general overview of its transitional justice. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4.0       THE GENERAL OVERVIEW OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN   
                                 BURUNDI POST CONFLICTING STATE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
After attainment of her independence in 1962, Burundi has experienced and passed 
through several cycles of violence. The settling of accounts for past abuses seems 
entangled while popular consultations unfold slowly. Provisional immunities could 
jeopardize prospects of accountability in the absence of a comprehensive redress 
policy for victims and in light of continuing human rights violations.182An 
opportunity for peace finally arose with the signing of the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement in August 2000. 
 
4.2  The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi and the   
            Kalomoh 
This Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi and the Kalomoh 
report provide the basis for dealing with issues of reconciliation and justice for mass 
atrocities of the past in Burundi. The Kalomoh report assessed the advisability and 
feasibility of the mechanisms proposed in the agreement. The report recommended 
for the creation of the TRC in accordance with the agreement and, instead of the 
special tribunal provided for in the agreement, a special chamber within Burundi’s 
court system staffed by national and international members and personnel.183 The 
Security Council approved the Kalomoh report in Resolution 1606(2005). Since then, 
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the UN and the government have been engaged in protracted negotiations regarding 
the operational framework for the proposed mechanisms.184 Although there is a 
consensus on the hybrid composition of the truth and reconciliation commission and 
the special chamber, two series of negotiations failed to secure an agreement between 
the government and the UN on the operational framework. The points of contention 
relate to the relationship between the truth and reconciliation commission and the 
special chamber, the independence of the chamber’s prosecutor, and the power of the 
truth and reconciliation commission to grant amnesty.185  
 
In November 2007 the government of Burundi and the UN agreed on the creation of 
a tripartite which comprised of the UN, government, and civil society steering 
committee to lead national consultations on transitional justice mechanisms. The six-
member committee was tasked with collecting Burundians’ perceptions of the twin 
transitional justice mechanisms to be created. Though this process is vital in a 
context where the mechanisms proposed were designed without sufficient input from 
the public and civil society, it created conflict between the government and the UN 
over the outcome.186 
 
 The UN wanted to embark on consultations with the aim of collecting public views 
on the modalities of both mechanisms, whereas the government considered 
consultations as an opportunity to marshal popular support for the exclusive creation 
of a truth and reconciliation commission, and rejection of the mechanism for setting 
criminal accountability. All sides in the conflict had previously agreed on some form 
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of de facto amnesty to avoid prosecution. Although the Arusha agreement prohibited 
amnesty for serious international crimes, subsequent peace agreements provided 
provisional immunity to rebel groups to facilitate their return to the country and 
participation in the political process.187 A number of constraints have inhibited 
efforts to address issues of impunity and reconciliation. In August 2010, the six-
member committee produced the results of the consultation, but the report has yet to 
be released to the public.188 However, neither the TRC nor the judicial mechanism to 
try those responsible for grave human rights violations has been implemented. 
 
Apart from what has been elaborated above, the transitional justice has become a 
prominent element of the liberal peace-building approach.189 And it aims at 
promoting social and political integration and reconciliation, to enhance the rule of 
law, to fight impunity and to increase trust in government institutions. This 
normative model is mainly based on humanitarian law, international criminal law 
and human rights law.190 However, Burundi lacks the political will that is necessary 
to implement such a normative model of transitional justice.191The implementation 
deadlock might be due to the fact that transitional justice touches on fundamental 
interests, especially those of individuals who have been implicated in past violence.  
Nevertheless, as provided before, transitional justice in Burundi might also be 
contested because the political actors’ understandings of the basic concepts of 
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transitional justice, such as justice, reconciliation and truth, do not conform to 
international transitional justice norms or the liberal peace-building model.192 
 
4.3 The Constitutional Transformation and Power Sharing 
Fifteen years after the signature of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, 
there is a state of the art of power-sharing in Burundi. Used both for the purpose of 
war termination and of constitutional transformation, power-sharing played a critical 
role in Burundi’s transition from conflict to peace. With the benefit of hindsight, 
Burundi has managed to overcome the adoption problem. There is sustainable 
respect for power-sharing, in particular in its ethnic dimension. 
  
At the same time, the impact of recent developments, including the 2010 general 
elections, on the erosion of one of the pillars of power-sharing in Burundi.193 In order 
to understand its dynamics, power-sharing must be placed in the context of stubborn, 
context specific historical political and institutional features. Then, on 6 July 2015, 
President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda was appointed as mediator on the Burundian 
crisis by the East African Community (EAC). On 28 December 2015, he hosted a 
political dialogue on the crisis in Burundi at the State House in Kampala.  
Participants included government representatives, civil society members and 
representatives of a variety of officially recognized political parties and other 
political movements based outside Burundi. The presence of the opposition coalition, 
the National Council for the Respect of the Arusha Agreement and the Rule of Law 
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(CNARED) was deplored by Burundi’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Alain-Aime´ 
Nyamitwe.194 The Burundian government reaffirmed its position that those 
responsible for the failed coup d’e´tat attempt of 13 May 2015 and for the political 
violence in Bujumbura before and after the coup had no place at the dialogue. 
President Museveni, however, insisted that all parties must be able to participate in 
the talks and called upon the government not to exclude the so called radical 
opposition, but rather to grant them temporary immunity.  
 
In January 2016, two rebel movements  Forces re´publicaines du Burundi 
(Republican Forces of Burundi; FOREBU) and Re´sistance pour un Etat de droit au 
Burundi (Resistance for the Rule of Law in Burundi; RED TABARA)  announced an 
armed struggle to topple the Pierre Nkurunziza government.195 As a result, the issue 
of inclusiveness of the talks and the granting of temporary immunity has become 
even more complex. Museveni’s suggestion to grant immunite´ provisoire to the 
opposition was a clear reference to Burundi’s earlier experience with peace talks and 
temporary immunities. In November 2003, when the main rebel movement National 
Council for the CNDD-FDD of Nkurunziza signed the Global Ceasefire Agreement 
(GCA), immunite´ provisoire protected the movement’s leadership against the risk of 
judicial prosecution upon its return to Bujumbura. The 2006 peace agreement with 
the other, last-remaining rebel movement Agathon Rwasa’s FNL-Palipehutu also 
included temporary immunity.196 The current government established after the 
strongly contested polls of 2015 is dominated by the CNDD-FDD party of re-elected 
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President Nkurunziza and includes representatives of Rwasa’s FNL party. 
Museveni’s call to grant temporary immunity to political opponents thus clearly 
found inspiration in Burundi’s recent history and in its, until recently, successful 
transition to peace after a decade of civil war. Like Nkurunziza and Rwasa before, 
several current opposition leaders living in exile are the target of arrest warrants and 
extradition requests. Therefore, from a short-term conflict-settlement-oriented 
perspective, it seems logical and necessary to grant temporary immunity to 
opponents invited to the negotiations table. This is by no means unique to the case of 
Burundi. Mediator Museveni may in fact also have found inspiration in customary 
international humanitarian law, which includes a rule that: 
 
At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power must endeavour to grant the 
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in a non-
international armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons 
related to the armed conflict, with the exception of persons suspected of, 
accused of or sentenced for war crimes.197 
 
The amnesties and other safeguards against criminal prosecution have been 
considered a necessary evil for those situations in which a negotiated settlement 
rather than a military victory is the only viable option.198 Museveni’s suggestion to 
grant temporary immunity to those allegedly involved in a military coup attempt is 
therefore, at first sight, not problematic. On 2 March 2016, the EAC heads of state 
appointed former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa to assist and facilitate the 
mediation led by Museveni. At a first round of internationally requested199 dialogues 
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under his facilitation on 22 to 24 May 2016, no meaningful progress was made 
towards a political solution. As long as there is no mutually hurting stalemate for all 
parties involved, the crisis and the targeted assassinations and reprisal killings and 
disappearances that come with it may well linger on. Another scenario in which 
temporary immunity will not be used is that of an escalation of the crisis into an open 
possibly even international armed conflict, with one party staging a military 
victory.200 
 
However, in the scenario of a genuine dialogue followed by a negotiated settlement, 
the issue of temporary immunity is most likely to reappear on the agenda and in the 
toolbox of international mediators. Because, there are at least three reasons to fear 
that a new round of temporary immunity may reproduce the same longer-term 
effects, unless lessons are learned from previous experiences, as follows;201 First, 
through learning by doing and trial and error, most of Burundi’s political elites  who 
were mostly the same actors involved in previous peace talks  have conceptualized 
politics as a continuous process of balancing their political, security and other 
interests, if need be at the expense of collective good such as truth and 
accountability.202 In all of the previous elite driven settlements, notwithstanding 
some lip service paid to it, justice was notably absent. There is no reason to assume 
that they would behave differently this time. Secondly, over the past decade, 
Burundi’s international development partners have tolerated or even encouraged a 
situation of enough peace, namely, stabilization and control even if that goes hand in 
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hand with militarized governance, executive control over the judiciary and the 
gradual closing down of democratic space for civil society.203 In addition, they may 
rightly not see any short-term cost of granting seemingly temporary immunity to 
negotiating parties. Thirdly, domestic voices calling for an end to a longstanding 
culture of impunity in terms of human rights crimes exist but have never had strong 
political leverage. Nor have they been able to rely on an independent judiciary. As a 
result of the crisis, these voices have, on the one hand, been oppressed and silenced 
by the government and, on the other, politically framed by opposition elites who may 
well not take them seriously when striking a next deal that includes temporary 
immunities.204 
 
4.4 The United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi 
The United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB) was established 
by the Human Rights Council through resolution A/HRC/S-24 of 17 December 2015 
which asked the High Commissioner for Human Rights to urgently organize and 
dispatch on the most expeditious basis possible a mission by independent existing 
experts as follows:  
 
First, to undertake swiftly an investigation into violations and abuses of human rights 
with a view to prevent further deterioration of the human rights situation; to make 
recommendations on the improvement of the human rights situation and on technical 
assistance to support reconciliation and the implementation of the Arusha 
Agreement. Second, to engage with the Burundian authorities and all other relevant 
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stakeholders including United Nations agencies, civil society, refugees, the field 
presence of the Office of the High Commissioner in Burundi, authorities of the 
African Union, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in 
particular with a view of preventing such atrocities in future.205 
 
The third mission was to help the State to fulfil its human rights obligations, to 
ensure accountability for human rights violations and abuses, including by 
identifying alleged perpetrators, to adopt appropriate transitional justice measures 
and to maintain the spirit of the Arusha Agreement and fourth, to ensure the 
complementarily and coordination of this effort with other efforts of the United 
Nations, the African Union and other appropriate regional and international entities, 
drawing on the expertise of the African Union and the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights to the extent practicable.206 
 
The Human Rights Council resolution requested to have a representative of the 
experts issue an oral update and participate in an enhanced interactive dialogue 
which was undertaken at its 31st session of March 2016. The resolution asked also 
the experts to issue a final written report at its 33th session of September 2016 and to 
participate in an interactive dialogue during the same session. Hence, history may not 
necessarily repeat itself. At the time of writing this report, it is still not clear whether 
there will be any inclusive and genuine political dialogue or peace talks that might 
give rise to another round of temporary immunity. 
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4.5 Conclusion  
Therefore, transitional justice as a political process of negotiated values and power 
relations that attempts to constitute the future based on lessons from the past. 
Transitional justice is not a value-neutral process but instead reflects certain 
normative beliefs and values about what a post-conflict society and state should look 
like.207 The production of particular truth narratives and lessons from the past might 
be used as an instrument for political struggles to construct, forge and mould society 
and the political apparatus, and/or as a strategy to protect partisan interests to achieve 
unexpected goals.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.0  RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The study focused on examining the convergence of peace and justice towards 
resolving past atrocities in transitional society in Burundi. In course of dealing with 
the study, the study was guided by the following questions. The first was whether 
convergence of peace and justice would lead to restoration of peaceful society. And 
the second was whether mechanisms employed in resolving the past atrocities would 
succeed. 
 
The study used doctrinal legal research in depth dealing with the matter at hand 
which employed statutory materials, case reports, standard textbooks and reference 
books, legal periodicals, Parliamentary Debates and Government Reports. These 
materials paved a way for discussion of the questions provided before in this study. 
The discussion was made by considering several stages. The first stage involves 
identifying and analysing facts, and formulating the issues.  
 
5.2 The Convergence of Peace and Justice towards the Restoration of 
Peaceful Society 
To respond on the issue at hand the study taken a look in Paul Van Zyl’s article 
Promoting Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict societies. The author is of the view 
that, it is important to accept that tensions exist between peace and justice in the 
short-term and that in some hard cases it is prudent and defensible to delay justice 
claims in order to achieve an end to hostilities or a transition to a democratic order. 
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Nevertheless, justice claims should not be deferred indefinitely, not just because of 
the likely corrosive effect on efforts to build sustainable peace, but because to do so 
would be to compound a grave injustice that victims have already suffered. 
Transitional justice strategies should be an integral part of any effort to build a 
sustainable peace, but in some circumstances peace and justice may not be 
completely compatible in the short-term. If justice is deferred, then every effort 
should be made to ensure that the prospect of achieving accountability in the medium 
to long-term are preserved and that as much of the transitional justice agenda as can 
be achieved in the short-term is implemented. 
 
The author pointed out that transitional justice mechanisms should be incorporated 
into peace agreements if they embody a genuine desire to deal with the past as 
opposed to a cosmetic effort to avoid accountability. Peace agreements that contain 
bona fide commitments to deal with the past should strike the right balance between 
signalling this commitment in the text of the agreement and not overprescribing 
details that should emerge from a subsequent process of national consultation. The 
author also provided the state obligations in dealing with human rights abuse and 
correspondingly clears prohibitions regarding, for example, blanket amnesties for 
international crimes. This has been supported by the ratification of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) which reinforces existing obligations and created new 
standards, by requiring each signatory to respond appropriately to human rights 
abuse or face action by the court. A further important development occurred in 
October 2004; when the UN Secretary General submitted a report to the Security 
Council setting out for the first time the UN’s approach to transitional justice issues. 
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The report provides the need for complimenting peace and justice in resolving 
conflict. This is an extremely important development in both operational and 
normative terms. Hence, strengthening of international legal obligations and a 
growing normative consensus that gross violations of human rights should be 
remedied has generally shifted the emphasis away from deciding whether to address 
the past, to questions of how this should be done. This created extraordinary 
opportunities to examine the intersection between transitional justice and post-
conflict peace building in a number of different contexts and establish good practices 
based on comparative policy analysis. This process cannot simply transplant a 
successful model from one context to another but must explore the factors that made 
that model work and ascertain whether they applicable in other circumstances. 
 
The other response to this issue has been made by the United Nations Security 
Council report’s on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-
conflict societies. The report provide that, peace missions have also helped host 
countries to address past human rights abuses by establishing tribunals, truth and 
reconciliation mechanisms and victim reparation programmes. Though, not all peace 
operations are mandated to address transitional justice. The reports therefore provide 
that, peace operations must better assist national stakeholders to develop their own 
reform vision, their own agenda, their own approaches to transitional justice and 
their own national plans. The most important role the peace operations can play is to 
facilitate the processes through which various stakeholders’ debate and outline the 
elements of their country’s plan to address the injustices of the past and to secure 
sustainable justice for the future, in accordance with international standards, 
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domestic legal traditions and national aspirations. In doing so, consideration should 
be on how to respect and support local ownership, local leadership and a local 
constituency for reform, while at the same time remaining faithful to United Nations 
norms and standards. Being faithful is to have directly involvement in the protection 
of human rights and human security where conflict has eroded as no ad hoc, 
temporary or external measures can replace a functioning national justice system. 
Thus, the United Nations objects have to be engaged in helping countries to 
strengthen national systems for the administration of justice in accordance with 
international standards.  
 
However, this should be through effective strategies for building domestic justice 
systems which will give due attention to legislation that is in conformity with 
international human rights law and that responds to the country’s current needs and 
realities is fundamental. It is hereby, noted that this national justices system will help 
in the process of prosecuting the perpetrators of the conflict led to violations of 
human rights. Therefore, peace and justice could be attained at the same time rather 
than depending on peaceful negotiations without adjudicating the culprits of the 
conflict. 
 
Also, a report of the AU Panel of the Wise provides that Africa has been grappling 
with the challenges of implementing creative mechanisms to promote peace, 
reconciliation, and justice. Though the report is on promoting peace, reconciliation 
and justice our main consideration in this study is on peace and justice. Articles 6 and 
14 of the Protocol Relating to Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of 
the AU mandates peacemaking and peace building with respect to restoration of the 
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rule of law and the establishment of conditions for  post-conflict rebuilding of 
society. This should inevitably include a comprehensive framework on addressing 
the issue of justice and accountability. 
 
Further, Article 31, 32, and 33 of AU Policy Framework on Post Conflict 
Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) under its Human Rights, Justice and 
Reconciliation chapter explicitly recognizes the need to protect human rights. It 
obliges the AU to develop mechanisms to deal with past and on-going grievances; 
provide space for a context-based approach to PCRD. Also to facilitate mobilization 
of society to ensure the legitimacy and relevance of the PCRD model adopted and 
addressing the tension between choices of impunity and reconciliation as well as 
encourage and facilitate peace building and reconciliation activities from the national 
to the grassroots levels.  
 
Further, allowing for opportunities to invoke traditional mechanisms of reconcili-
ation or justice, to the extent that they are consistent with the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and establishing efficient and independent 
justice sectors and provide for the use of AU structures and other international 
instruments to reinforce human rights, justice and reconciliation. From what has been 
explained above, the Panel of the Wise further provide that there should be a 
programmatic and normative imperative. As the embodiment of Africa’s 
determination for peace, justice, and reconciliation, the AU is obliged to engender 
programs that make possible the realization of the African transitional justice vision 
and aspirations. Furthermore, given that achieving peace, reconciliation, and justice 
in the aftermath of mass atrocities is a complex matter which requires extraordinary 
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measures, it elaborates in a holistic manner the entire continuum of measures 
required to demonstrate the commitment to peace, justice, and reconciliation, and 
lays down minimum standards and benchmarks for combating impunity and 
evaluating compliance. Also it provide that there should be a model that would be 
adaptable to specific country situations like Burundi and because of its appeal to an 
African sense of justice, needs, and aspirations, it will empower and encourage 
affected countries to take the lead in designing appropriate transitional justice 
mechanisms. 
 
5.3 Different Mechanisms Employed in Resolving the Past Atrocities 
In responding to this issue, the United States Institute of Peace through its 
transitional justice: information handbook provide that: in determining which 
transitional justice mechanism or combination of mechanisms is appropriate for a 
given country depends on many factors and the unique circumstances of a period of 
abuse such as: whether crimes are widespread, or focused on one region or ethnic 
group, the number of perpetrators responsible, or only a few, whether the crimes acts 
of the State, or those of insurgents, or both. Whether the perpetrators are still more or 
less in power, or there has been a clean transition to a new government. And, 
whether the state has sufficient resources to implement a justice mechanism or the 
courts are credible and whether the state can afford individual reparations. 
 
Then, depending on the answers, certain options would be more viable than others. 
The most important point is that a careful assessment must be done about the 
circumstances of the conflict and the positions and interests of the victims, leaders, 
and the general public before any transitional justice mechanism is decided. The best 
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way to determine different groups’ needs and positions is through thorough 
consultations and, ideally, public debate about different transitional justice options. 
With that in mind, below are some factors that affect the utility of different 
transitional justice mechanisms. These are not concrete rules, but rather present 
different ways of looking at the issues. 
 
5.3.1   The First Mechanism is Prosecution  
Prosecutions should provide the most direct form of accountability, and work best 
when there are credible courts under national, international, or hybrid which would 
be available to hold trials. Because the number of potential defendants implicated in 
past abuses is often quite large, and prosecuting them all would generally be beyond 
the financial, human and political capacity of the state, the number of perpetrators 
who can be prosecuted is typically small. There must be strong political will to 
sustain prosecutions, which is often lacking when perpetrators or their political 
partners are still sharing power. Prosecutions take significant time and money to 
conclude, and only address the crimes of individual defendants. But in many ways, 
successful prosecutions make the strongest statement against impunity and signal to 
victims that the new government is willing to make a clean break with an abusive 
past. Thus, the United States Institute of Peace provide that, prosecutions should 
serve to deter future crimes and be a source of comfort to victims by reflecting a new 
set of social norms, and begin the process of reforming and building trust in 
government institutions.208 It is important however to recognise that criminal justice 
systems are designed for societies in which the violation of the law is the exception 
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and not the rule. When violations are widespread and systematic, involving tens or 
hundreds of thousands of crimes, criminal justice systems simply cannot cope. This 
is because the criminal justice process ought to demonstrate a scrupulous 
commitment to fairness and due process and this necessarily entails a significant 
commitment of time and resources.209 It is important to emphasise that recognising 
criminal justice systems’ structural inability to cope with mass atrocity, should not be 
construed as a de-legitimisation of the role of prosecution or punishment in dealing 
with past crimes.  
 
Therefore, the criminal justice is part of the response to massive human rights 
violations and works best if combined with other mechanisms of transitional justice. 
If domestic prosecutions are possible, they can signal a break with the past, foster 
renewed public trust in institutions and restore the dignity of victims. At the same 
time, prosecutions generally face many hurdles and require significant resources and 
a high commitment to fairness, transparency and public consultations. A clear 
prosecutorial strategy helps to make the best use of limited resources. 
 
5.3.2   The Second Mechanism is Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
The TRC are suitable for analysing widespread and longstanding patterns of abuse, 
or for cases in which atrocities: whether committed in secret by the State or in remote 
areas or are relatively unknown. The aim of a TRC is to ascertain the facts and 
causes of systemic abuse in the most objective way possible, and not necessarily to 
directly punish individuals involved. As official investigative bodies, TRC require 
significant political will to implement, and generally are not effective unless the 
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commissioners are truly independent of the parties to the conflict or abuse. The TRC 
are not simply closed academic inquiries, but serve as a way for all of society to 
explore exactly what kind of abuses occurred and why, and how to prevent their 
recurrence in the future, but in a non-criminal context. They should therefore be 
formed on the basis of extensive public consultations and often work best when their 
activities include significant public outreach and engagement. 
 
The United States Institute of Peace210 further provide that, truth-seeking processes 
assist post-conflict and transitional societies to investigate past human rights 
violations and are undertaken by truth commissions, commissions of inquiry, or other 
fact finding missions. The TRC is a unique institution, but their core activities 
usually include collecting statements from victims and witnesses, conducting 
thematic research, including gender and children analysis of violations including 
their causes and consequences, organizing public hearings and other awareness 
programs, and publishing a final report outlining findings and recommendations. The 
commissions of inquiry and other fact-finding mechanisms similarly seek to unravel 
the truth behind allegations of past human rights abuses, but generally operate under 
more narrowly defined mandates.  
 
From what has been explained above, the TRC have the following limitations: that 
the TRC require sustained funding and political support to be effective, and there is a 
real danger that they are increasingly seen as a panacea, inserted into peace 
agreements in order to provide options for leaders seeking to avoid criminal 
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accountability. Though overall, truth commissions can have a powerful effect when 
used appropriately and effectively. When conducted in consultation with local actors, 
they have the potential to contribute to stability, building a just society, and laying 
the foundations for deepening the rule of law. At their best, TRC can produce 
influential investigative accounts of human rights violations while providing victims 
with at least symbolic reparations and accountability. They can support wider peace 
building efforts, example in Sierra Leone, strengthen human rights standards, and 
propose recommendations that address critical issues of institutional reform example 
in South Africa. Their findings may not lead to criminal accountability, but if they 
name perpetrators, human rights activists can campaign to prevent these perpetrators 
from taking up future positions in government. Thus, when properly executed, TRC 
can be one among a host of mechanisms for restoring the rule of law.  
 
Therefore, TRC can foster a common understanding and acknowledgement of an 
abusive past, and if they are effectively embedded in a comprehensive justice 
perspective, they can provide a foundation for building a strong and lasting peace. 
Carefully structuring and implementing a truth commission process is crucial to its 
having this positive impact. 
 
5.3.3   The Third Mechanism is the Traditional Justice System  
This mechanism has been discussed through the book by the International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.211 Its provide that the TJS should be a 
drawing on traditional structures, local initiatives may avoid some of the pitfalls of 
international institutions imposed from above, particularly the lack of ownership and 
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consultation. This is a shift from state-level to community-level processes of 
accountability for  example the Bashingantahe in Burundi, in the absence of a 
judicial system still it offered a process from below that sought reconciliation 
without losing sight of justice. Hence, it often referred to as a hybrid tribunal because 
of the mix of national and international staff by referring cases of serious crimes to 
that body.212 
 
Therefore, this local justice initiatives offer rich possibilities and by their nature are 
closer to victims’ groups. But in most instances they work well when they are part of 
a holistic strategy to seek and publicize the truth, restore broken relations, and pursue 
justice for serious crimes. They are also increasingly being offered as solutions in 
peace agreements. The TJS provide an array of options available to address 
accountability; every society has to find its own formula that adheres to international 
standards and best practices. 
 
Though, both transitional justice mechanisms discussed in this study possess their 
own strengths and weaknesses, this is not to say that both are equally effective or 
equally ineffective for that matter of resolving the conflict.  One may, in fact prove 
far better suited than the other in regards to certain situations. However, the purpose 
of this study in this issue is not to make a normative suggestion regarding the 
superiority of one method versus the other.  Rather, this study would prefer to 
suggest the recognition that there may not be an appropriate manner wherein to 
prescribe one or the other at this time.  It is becoming clearer that the choice of action 
through legal response must be weighed carefully and implemented in combination 
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with other appropriate forms of intervention.213 It is therefore much more pertinent to 
discuss these strategies as they relate to context. Therefore, from the above 
investigation the key findings of this study can be identified summarily into two: first 
is when peace and justice could be attained at the same time without prosecution of 
the perpetrators, and second is where TJM’s vary depending on the unique 
circumstances and gravity of abuse. The following part is going to give a general 
conclusion and recommendations which have been seen from the discussion 
undertaken in this chapter. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
There is a need for sequencing Peace and Justice: the study provides that peace and 
justice are interconnected, mutually interdependent, and equally desirable. However, 
it is also equally self-evident that in an on-going conflict the most urgent desire of 
the affected population is to cease hostilities, restore peace and security. 
Nevertheless, when stability is restored and victims protected, there is need for 
concerted action to strengthen institutions, including creating new ones to deliver 
justice and hold certain categories of perpetrators accountable to consolidate the 
pursuit of sustainable peace. 
 
Also, there should be complementarily between the African countries with the 
International justice (ICC) as the AU has commitments to fighting impunity as well 
as recognizing that the ICC has an important role to play. It is critical that the 
necessary adjustments and amendments be made to the ICC Status, in line with the 
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recommendations of the ministerial preparatory meeting on the Rome Statute, held in 
Addis Ababa on November 6, 2009, as endorsed by the Assembly of the Union at its 
14th Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa in January 2010. This marked the 
beginning for a positive complementarily between Africa and international justice, as 
there was no overarching framework in Africa to harmonize the pursuit of justice and 
accountability in Africa making enforcement and implementation of international 
justice controversial. To contribute to development of international norms, all 
measures under this framework including initiatives by the AU to combat impunity, 
would build on the obligation of furthering international human rights and 
accountability under the United Nations Charter, the AU Constitutive Act, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the Genocide Convention. 
 
There should be a need to merge those peace agreements and Security Council 
resolutions and its mandates. The country should give priority attention to the 
restoration and explicitly mandating support for transitional justice, particularly 
where UN support for judicial and prosecutorial processes is required. The country 
should respect, incorporate by reference and apply international standards for 
fairness, due process and human rights in the administration of justice as well as 
rejecting any endorsement of amnesty for genocide, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity, including those relating to ethnic, gender and sexually based international 
crimes, ensure that no such amnesty previously granted is a bar to prosecution before 
any United Nations created or assisted court. The country also should ensure that the 
United Nations does not establish or directly participate in any tribunal for which 
capital punishment is included among possible sanctions. Further it should make a 
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requirement that all judicial processes, courts and prosecutions be credible, fair, and 
consistent with established international standards for the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary, the effectiveness, impartiality and fairness of 
prosecutors and the integrity of the judicial process. 
 
There should be recognition and respect of the rights of both victims and accused 
persons, in accordance with international standards, with particular attention to 
groups most affected by conflict and a breakdown of the rule of law, among them 
children, women, minorities, prisoners and displaced persons, and ensure that 
proceedings for the redress of grievances include specific measures for their 
participation and protection. It should avoid the imposition of externally imposed 
models and mandate and fund national needs assessment and national consultation 
processes, with the meaningful participation of Government, civil society and key 
national constituencies to determine the course of transitional justice and restoration 
of the rule of law. 
 
Further, where mixed tribunals are envisaged for divided societies and in the absence 
of clear guarantees regarding the real and perceived objectivity, impartiality and 
fairness of the national judiciary, consider mandating a majority of international 
judges, taking account of the views of various national groups, in order to enhance 
the credibility and perceived fairness of such tribunals among all groups in society. It 
should insist upon full governmental cooperation with international and mixed 
tribunals, including in the surrender of accused persons upon request.214 Also adopt 
an integrated and comprehensive approach transitional justice, including proper 
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sequencing and timing for implementation of peace processes, transitional justice 
processes, electoral processes and other transitional processes and consider the 
establishment of national human rights commissions as part of transitional 
arrangements.215 
 
5.5 Recommendations 
The study is of the view that, there should be a need of leading the Country to 
Reconciliation by Establishing the Truth about the Origins and Nature of the 
Conflict. National reconciliation was considered to be the cornerstone of peace 
building in Burundi. Article 8 of Protocol I stipulates that a national commission 
known as the National Truth and Reconciliation, shall be established to fulfil the 
following main functions: first, to undertake investigation of the killings and all 
human rights abuses committed; second to control Arbitration and reconciliation; and 
third to ensure clarification of history to offer one reading of Burundi’s history. In 
the spirit of the Arusha Agreement, the National Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission was expected to be created without delay. Article 8; Section 2 (b) states 
that Members of the Commission shall be appointed by the transitional Government 
in consultation with the Bureau of the transitional National Assembly. As discussed 
in Section 2, transitional institutions were expected to last three years. So, it was 
expected that the TRC would be created within three years following the beginning 
of the transitional period which started about one year after the signing of the Arusha 
Agreement.  However, to date, the TRC has not started its work. Moreover, in 
addition to the problems associated with its creation it is highly likely that the current 
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political upheaval in Burundi will not permit the TRC to start its work in its current 
composition. If the current conflict opposing the president with the civil society, the 
opposition, and a segment of the population is not resolved quickly, members of the 
TRC will most probably resign or be changed; alternatively, if the conflict persists, 
the country will be dealing with another crisis and the conditions will not be 
conducive for truth telling and reconciliation. 
 
In terms of policy sequencing, the establishment of the TRC should have been 
among the first institutions created to lay the ground for a genuine process of 
reconciliation so as to find a lasting solution to the recurring civil war. Hence the 
need to find out why it has taken so long to create the TRC and whether the 
leadership really want a TRC as described in the Arusha Agreement. While answers 
to these questions could only be speculative, it is inconceivable that the ruling party 
would allow that some of its prominent leaders be investigated for crimes they might 
have committed during the civil war. 
 
In this sense, the recent establishment of the TRC could have been just a political act 
to appease the population and the international community.216 Indeed, the period to 
be covered by the Commission under Article 6, from independence on 1 July 1962 to 
4 December 2008, comprises not only a time when CNDD-FDD was in power but 
also a period when it was engaged in a civil war and might have been involved in 
acts falling under the jurisdiction of the Commission. It is likely that fearing a 
backlash from the process, the ruling party might have avoided creating this 
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commission and, later, under pressure, decided to create it but impairing it from its 
inception. Therefore, it appears that the ruling elite has chosen to continue with the 
old policy of protecting suspected criminals from within its ranks, a practice that 
started in 1965. 
 
Judging by the way other recent commissions established to probe cases of 
extrajudicial killings have been conducted, there is reason to doubt that the TRC will 
meet the expectations of the public, particularly those who have lost loved ones 
during Burundi’s past conflicts. In all recent commissions established by the 
government to bring to light circumstances surrounding some major crimes, the fact 
that government agents were among the main suspects meant that the commissions 
either never ended their work or were carried out in a way that covered rather than 
uncovered the suspected criminals. This, again, is the continuation of a practice that 
started well before the current leaders came to power. Presidents Pierre Buyoya who 
was in power when the Arusha Agreement was signed until 2003 and Domitien 
Ndayizeye who was president from 2003 to 2005 could have created the TRC. 
 
Further, there is a need of proposing an institutional framework for transition that 
would bring about the conditions for democratic renewal through equitable power 
sharing. Measures under this rubric were evidently in favour of the former Hutu 
rebels as they were the ones who had been politically side-lined by previous regimes. 
These arrangements were immediately implemented in the aftermath of the Arusha 
Agreement with the formation of transitional governments that were required to 
include a specific number of representatives from the two main groups under 
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Protocol II, Chapter II, and Article 15. For example, the first transitional government 
was formally inaugurated on 1 November 2001. It had fourteen Hutu ministers and 
twelve Tutsi ministers. This measure was relatively easy to implement as the practice 
of including ministers from the two groups had started even before the 1993 civil 
war. The only difference was that following the Arusha negotiations, the quota 
system was codified and even included in the country’s constitution.  
 
Also, a determination to enhance global accountability and install African values, 
where the international norms and standards of accountability for international 
crimes are evolving rapidly but without the essential African input and voices. While 
Africans also share aspirations for these global accountability norms, some contexts 
in Africa make their implementation impossible. In such circumstances sequencing is 
necessary. The traditional practices and customary norms in Africa like Ubuntu in 
South Africa, Gacaca in Rwanda, and Mato Oput in Uganda have proven to be 
useful to complement the need for criminal prosecutions for certain categories of 
crimes.  
 
In Burundi transitional justice can serve as a complementary element to existing 
judicial structures that have either broken down or been rendered ineffective by the 
conflict and the painful experiences of many. As a traditional institution for 
managing conflict the institution of bashingantahe can act as a safeguard 
guaranteeing community harmony and reconciliation. Culture does not change 
overnight. Mindful of this, once it is back on its feet the institution of bashingantahe 
can play its full social and political regulatory role in the maintenance of peace and 
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social cohesion and as a moral and cultural reference point. Additionally, it can play 
a significant role in the process of reconciliation in a society which has torn itself 
apart in the course of recent years, but is today committed to the path of 
reconciliation and reconstruction.  
 
Therefore, institutionalizing these norms and integrating generic African practices to 
international norms would further enhance international commitment to end impunity 
and promote peace and justice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
 
 
                                                         BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
BOOK(S) 
Curzon L. B and Richards, P. H. (2007). The Longman Dictionary of Law, 7th Ed. 
Pearson Education Limited: London. 
Daley, P. (2007). The Burundi Peace Negotiations: An African Experience of Peace-
making, in: 34Review of African Political Economy112, 2007, 333-352. 
Ðukic, D. (2007). Transitional justice and the International Criminal Court in ‘‘the 
interests of justice? Selected article on international humanitarian law in: 
89International Review of the Red Cross 867, The University Centre for 
International Humanitarian Law: Geneva, 2007. 
Elster, J. (1998). Coming to Terms with the Past: A Framework for the Study of 
Justice in the Transition to Democracy, in: 39European Journal of Sociology. 
7−48. 
Galtung J, (1996). Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and 
Civilization, London: PRIO/Sage.  
Huyse, L. (2008). ‘Introduction: tradition-based approaches in peace making, 
transitional justice and reconciliation policies’, in Huyse Luc and Salter Mark 
(eds.), Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. Learning 
from African Experiences, Stockholm, International IDEA,  1-22.  
Martin E. A. (2003). Oxford Dictionary of Law 5th Edition Oxford University Press, 
London. 
Matsuo, M. (2005). Concept of Peace Studies: A short Historical Sketch, Institute for 
Peace Science, Hiroshima University1- 26. Available at home. hiroshima_u.ac. 
jp/ heiwa /Pub/E20/conceptopeace.pdf (Accessed on October 23, 2015) 
84 
 
 
 
Nagy, R. (2008). Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections, in: 
29Third World Quarterly2, 275-289.  
Patton, M. Q. (2003). Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 3rded, Sage 
Publications: London.  
Peck, C. (1996). The United Nations System as a Dispute Settlement System: 
Improving Mechanisms for the Preventive and Resolution of Conflict,  Kluwer 
Law International: The Hague.  
Rubli, S, (Re) (2013). Making the social world: The Politics of Transitional Justice 
in Burundi, 48Africa Spectrum 1, Hamburg University Press: Hamburg, 3−24.  
Salter, M. and Huyse, L, (2008). Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent 
Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, (eds), International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Stockholm. 
Stef, V. (2009). ‘Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi: Twenty Years 
of Trial and Error,’ 44 Africa Spectrum 3, 63–86.  
Subotić,  J. (2009). Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans, Cornell 
University Press: Ithaca and London. 
Subotić,  J. (2009). Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans, Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press. 
Teitel,  R. (2006). Transitional Justice: Post War Legacies, 27Cardozo Law Review 
4, 2006, 1.  Also has been defined in the International Centre for Transitional 
Justice, What is Transitional Justice?, New York, 2008. Available at 
www.ictj.org/static/TJApproaches/ what is TJ/ICTJ_What is  TJ_ pa2008.pdf    
Uvin, P. (2009). Life after Violence: A People’s Story of Burundi, Zed Books, 
London and New York. 
85 
 
 
 
Vandeginste,  S. (2011). La Commission Vérité et Réconciliation et la qualification 
des faits: une question à première vue purement technique, Available at  
www.arib.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3772  (acessed 
on July 19,2016). 
Vandeginste, S. (2010). Stones Left Unturned: Law and Transitional Justice in 
Burundi, Antwerp:  Oxford.  
Vandeginste, S. (2012). ‘Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: How to 
Shed Light on the Past While Standing in the Dark Shadow of Politics?’ 
6International Journal of Transitional Justice 2,  355–365. 
Vandeginste, S. M. (2016). Burundi and the Perversity of Immunite´ Provisoire, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1−11. Available at 
http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ ( accessed on July 21, 2016). 
 
 
PAPER(S) 
Binamungu, C. S. M.  (2013). Division of Matrimonial Property in Tanzania: The 
Quest for Fairness. A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for 
the Degree of Doctorate of Philosophy in Law of the Open University of 
Tanzania.  
Rubli, S. (2011). National Consultations on Transitional Justice: The Inclusion of 
Civil Society in Transitional Justice in Burundi a paper presented at the 6th 
ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik, Iceland, 20−27. 
 
 
 
86 
 
 
 
REPORT(S) 
African Union Panel of the Wise, (2013). “Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in 
Africa: Opportunities and Challenges in the Fight against Impunity’’, The 
African Union Series. IPI: New York. 
Human Rights Watch (2009). Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for 
Peace, New York: Human Rights Watch. 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (2004). Report of the Secretary− General 
on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post−Conflict 
Societies, August 24, 2004, UNDOC. S/ 2004/616. 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Report of the Secretary− General on the 
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post− Conflict Societies, 
October 12, 2011, UN DOC. S/2011/634 Available at 
https://www.un.org/rule of law/ files/S_2011_634EN.Pdf . (Accessed on May 
22, 2016)  
                                                                   
